Part of RAND's continuing study of the underlying principles of mass competition. An account is presented of the power structure of voting games having a denumerable infinity of players. Special attention is given to the class of binary games in which each player has twice as much voting strength as the next. This research may result in mathematical tools that will help in predicting the behavior of large groups of competing participants common in political and economic life.
Shapley, Lloyd S., Values of Games With Infinitely Many Players. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1961. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM2912.html. Also available in print form.
Shapley, Lloyd S., Values of Games With Infinitely Many Players, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RM-2912-PR, 1961. As of September 08, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM2912.html