Download

Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 1.1 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback38 pages $20.00 $16.00 20% Web Discount

Discussion of two related aspects of incentive contracting: (1) interpretive problems that arise in implementing incentive contracts and (2) the relationship between sharing rates and different aspects of contract cost. The interpretive problems center around the effect of risk on contractors in weapon procurements and the presently undeterminable effect of different sharing rates on the initial targets that firms submit on incentive contracts. The authors present empirical analyses of data for 252 Air Force incentive contracts: 126 completed between 1959 and 1962, and 126 of the 1962-1963 period.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.