Discussion of two related aspects of incentive contracting: (1) interpretive problems that arise in implementing incentive contracts and (2) the relationship between sharing rates and different aspects of contract cost. The interpretive problems center around the effect of risk on contractors in weapon procurements and the presently undeterminable effect of different sharing rates on the initial targets that firms submit on incentive contracts. The authors present empirical analyses of data for 252 Air Force incentive contracts: 126 completed between 1959 and 1962, and 126 of the 1962-1963 period.
Deavers, Kenneth L. and John McCall, Notes on Incentive Contracting. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1966. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5019.html. Also available in print form.
Deavers, Kenneth L. and John McCall, Notes on Incentive Contracting, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RM-5019-PR, 1966. As of May 12, 2022: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5019.html