Innovation in the United States Air Force
Evidence from Six Cases
ResearchPublished May 13, 2016
This report assesses historical cases of U.S. Air Force innovation or apparent failure to innovate: innovations in strategic reconnaissance, nuclear survivability, suppression of enemy air defenses, and precision strategic attack; and apparent failures to innovate in close air support after World War II, early efforts to defeat Soviet integrated air defenses, and airborne high-value targeting in the post–Cold War era.
Evidence from Six Cases
ResearchPublished May 13, 2016
Developing innovative means to go "over not through" national strategic challenges has long been central to the Air Force's contribution to American security. In recent months, however, U.S. Air Force (USAF) senior leaders have raised the questions of whether the service is sufficiently innovative today and what can be done to make it more innovative for the future. This report assesses historical cases of Air Force innovation or apparent failure to innovate. These case studies include innovations in strategic reconnaissance (1946–1972), nuclear survivability (1950–1960), suppression of enemy air defenses (1975–1985), and precision strategic attack (1990–1999). Cases of apparent failure to innovate include close air support after World War II (1946–1951), early efforts to defeat Soviet integrated air defenses (1960–1970), and airborne high-value targeting in the post–Cold War era (1990–2001).
The research reported here was sponsored by Maj Gen Steven Kwast, Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review Office, and Maj Gen David Allvin, Director of Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Programs, Headquarters, United States Air Force. It was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE.
This publication is part of the RAND research report series. Research reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND research reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.