In this report, RAND researchers explore the factors, contexts, and mechanisms that shape a national government's decision to continue or end military and other operations during a conflict (i.e., national will to fight). To help U.S. leaders better understand and influence will to fight, the researchers propose an exploratory model of 15 variables that can be tailored and applied to a wide set of conflict scenarios.

National Will to Fight

Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't

Michael J. McNerney, Ben Connable, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Marek N. Posard, Jasen J. Castillo, Dan Madden, Ilana Blum, Aaron B. Frank, Benjamin J. Fernandes, et al.

ResearchPublished Sep 20, 2018

Cover: National Will to Fight
Download PDF

Does not include Appendixes.

Additional Downloads

Includes Appendixes A and B; Research Synopsis; other ebook formats

Order a print copy

What drives some governments to persevere in war at any price while others choose to stop fighting? It is often less-tangible political and economic variables, rather than raw military power, that ultimately determine national will to fight. In this analysis, the authors explore how these variables strengthen or weaken a government's determination to conduct sustained military operations, even when the expectation of success decreases or the need for significant political, economic, and military sacrifices increases.

This report is part of a broader RAND Arroyo Center effort to help U.S. leaders better understand and influence will to fight at both the national level and the tactical and operational levels. It presents findings and recommendations based on a wide-ranging literature review, a series of interviews, 15 case studies (including deep dives into conflicts involving the Korean Peninsula and Russia), and reviews of relevant modeling and war-gaming.

The authors propose an exploratory model of 15 variables that can be tailored and applied to a wide set of conflict scenarios and drive a much-needed dialogue among analysts conducting threat assessments, contingency plans, war games, and other efforts that require an evaluation of how future conflicts might unfold. The recommendations should provide insights into how leaders can influence will to fight in both allies and adversaries.

Key Findings

National will to fight has been insufficiently analyzed, but RAND Arroyo Center's multi-method research has identified some key variables to help understand and influence it

  • Will to fight is poorly analyzed and the least understood aspect of war.
  • A country with more factors in its favor (e.g., high stakes, strong cohesion, popular support) should have stronger will to fight and thus a higher chance of victory.
  • Political context (i.e., government type and national identity) plays an underlying but important role in strengthening or weakening will to fight. The research supports the proposition that strong democracies and totalitarian states are better able to maintain will to fight (through very different means) compared with democracies in turmoil or states with a mix of democratic and autocratic traits.
  • The influence of economic variables on will to fight depends on a government's alliances and its engagement with other countries. A country's economic dependency on and support from its allies often matter more than economic pressures from an adversary.
  • The effective use of engagement and information (internally directed indoctrination and externally directed messaging) can greatly influence will to fight and thus should improve the chances of victory. These mechanisms are most effective before a conflict begins.
  • When will to fight is evenly matched, superior military capabilities and infliction of greater casualties should lead to victory — or stalemate. In some scenarios, however, the infliction of casualties is actually more likely to strengthen an adversary's will to fight than to weaken it.

Recommendations

  • U.S. Army and other leaders should undertake assessments of national will to fight in potential wartime allies and adversaries.
  • If leaders wish to incorporate considerations of will to fight into future analysis, they will need to update strategic guidance documents and military doctrine.
  • U.S. Army and other leaders should incorporate will to fight considerations into international engagements, from high-level political discussions to multinational military exercises and tactical training events.
  • For the U.S. Army to help guide U.S. government efforts to operate more effectively in the information space, Army and other leaders should understand and influence the indoctrination and messaging efforts of other countries.

Order a Print Copy

Format
Paperback
Page count
154 pages
List Price
$33.00
Buy link
Add to Cart

Topics

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2018
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 154
  • Paperback Price: $33.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-1-9774-0053-6
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2477
  • Document Number: RR-2477-A

Citation

RAND Style Manual
McNerney, Michael J., Ben Connable, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Marek N. Posard, Jasen J. Castillo, Dan Madden, Ilana Blum, Aaron B. Frank, Benjamin J. Fernandes, In Hyo Seol, Christopher Paul, and Andrew Parasiliti, National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't, RAND Corporation, RR-2477-A, 2018. As of September 18, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2477.html
Chicago Manual of Style
McNerney, Michael J., Ben Connable, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Marek N. Posard, Jasen J. Castillo, Dan Madden, Ilana Blum, Aaron B. Frank, Benjamin J. Fernandes, In Hyo Seol, Christopher Paul, and Andrew Parasiliti, National Will to Fight: Why Some States Keep Fighting and Others Don't. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2477.html. Also available in print form.
BibTeX RIS

Research conducted by

The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training, U.S. Army (G-3/5/7) and conducted by the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program within the RAND Arroyo Center.

This publication is part of the RAND research report series. Research reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND research reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.