The Nightingale Versus the Bear
What Persuasion Research Reveals About Ukraine's and Russia's Messaging on the War
ResearchPublished Oct 12, 2023
Have Ukraine's information campaigns been more persuasive than Russia's since the start of the 2022 conflict? Who is winning the information war? The answers are complex. RAND researchers examined Russia's and Ukraine's influence campaigns — both those targeting each state's own people and military and those targeting the adversary — through the lens of persuasion research to understand whether these campaigns have been persuasive and why or why not.
What Persuasion Research Reveals About Ukraine's and Russia's Messaging on the War
ResearchPublished Oct 12, 2023
In the wake of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many prominent Western news outlets and policymakers concluded that Ukraine is winning the information war. Yet the reality may be more complex. RAND researchers used an evidence-based approach to try to understand whether official Ukrainian influence campaigns related to the current war have been more persuasive than Russian ones, and, if so, why Ukraine's messaging may have been effective while Russia's efforts may have fallen flat.
To do this, the researchers examined each side's messaging toward not only its own public and military personnel but also the public and military personnel of its adversary. Specifically, they looked at Ukrainian-, Russian-, and English-language content produced and disseminated by official Ukrainian and Russian authorities and their affiliated institutions in the days leading up to and following two incidents: (1) Russia's initial offensive and the Battle for Kyiv, in February–March 2022, and (2) the announcement of Russia's partial mobilization, in September 2022. The researchers analyzed the two countries' messaging through the lens of persuasion research, which offers insights about the characteristics associated with successful influence campaigns. This report details the researchers' analysis and conclusions.
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted by International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
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