Corporate Knowledge for Government Decisionmakers
Insights on Screening, Vetting, and Monitoring Processes
ResearchPublished Aug 3, 2020
The U.S. government seeks to ensure that those with access to sensitive information, material, people, or property can be trusted, through its security clearance processes. The authors of this report conducted interviews with human resources and security personnel in several corporate sectors to derive insights for the U.S. government regarding potentially effective ways to screen, vet, and monitor personnel over time.
The U.S. government's screening and vetting process seeks to ensure that those with access to classified or otherwise sensitive information, material, people, or property can be trusted. The authors of this report leverage interviews with human resources and security personnel in several corporate sectors (technology, pharmaceuticals, finance, and gaming) to derive insights for the U.S. government regarding potentially effective ways to screen and vet personnel and monitor personnel over time to decrease risk to U.S. national security and public trust.
Corporations in the sample exhibited considerable diversity in screening, vetting, and monitoring practices, much of which was industry-specific and some of which was related to corporate size and stage of growth. For example, smaller and newer corporations preferred less-structured, more-flexible and informal screening and vetting processes, with any malfeasance handled on a case-by-case basis. Larger organizations in established, highly regulated industries, such as finance and pharmaceuticals, tended to have more-structured processes, owing to the constant need to follow federal and state regulations. Overall, few corporations in the sample used artificial intelligence and machine learning automated-analysis approaches for prehire screening, vetting, or employee monitoring, and those that did indicated that extensive human management of these systems was necessary. Creative solutions to employee monitoring included the development of human intelligence networks and intelligence fusion capabilities.
Key Findings
- Proper triage of potential insider threats is challenging but critical. This triage involves sorting personnel and behaviors into those that require punitive action or removal versus those that can be addressed via support and counseling.
- To improve early threat detection, intelligence must be shared inside and outside the organization. Such intelligence sharing requires building relationships and trust across corporate functions and with outside agencies.
- A human in the loop is essential. Current approaches for threat detection involving artificial intelligence and machine learning require significant human involvement in calibrating and monitoring these systems.
- Taking a "whole of community" approach to identifying and mitigating threats helps share labor burden and improves effectiveness. The U.S. government may benefit from setting screening and vetting standards and relying on corporate capabilities to execute these standards.
Topics
Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Available
- Year: 2020
- Print Format: Paperback
- Paperback Pages: 76
- Paperback Price: $19.00
- Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-1-9774-0545-6
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA275-1
- Document Number: RR-A275-1
Citation
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Brown, Ryan Andrew, Douglas Yeung, Diana Gehlhaus, and Kathryn O'Connor, Corporate Knowledge for Government Decisionmakers: Insights on Screening, Vetting, and Monitoring Processes, RAND Corporation, RR-A275-1, 2020. As of September 19, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA275-1.html
Brown, Ryan Andrew, Douglas Yeung, Diana Gehlhaus, and Kathryn O'Connor, Corporate Knowledge for Government Decisionmakers: Insights on Screening, Vetting, and Monitoring Processes. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA275-1.html. Also available in print form.
Research conducted by
This research was sponsored by the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council Program Management Office and conducted within the Cyber and Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI).
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