In this report, the authors present methodologies for synthesizing space-related research and development efforts by the United States and China to project trends in future capabilities and operations that use space. These approaches can be used to decrease the scale and scope of future surprises and help the United States avoid falling behind in key areas of active space competition.

Blind Spot Indicators for Space

Methodologies for Assessing the Competitive Balance Between the United States and China

Louis Abramson, Alexis A. Blanc, Nicholas Blanchette, John Chen, Christian Kim, Baileigh McFall, Thomas Van Bibber, Maggie Habib, Garrett Hinck, Andrew Radin

ResearchPublished Jul 14, 2026

The ability of the United States to fight in and through space has disproportionately magnified the effectiveness of U.S. military forces. However, this advantage has been eroding as China ramps up its investments in the space domain. The speed and scale of China’s sprint to improve its space capabilities should ring alarm bells and prompts the following question: What do current research and development (R&D) efforts portend for future trends in China’s capabilities and operations that use space? Failing to understand these trends creates potential blind spots that could undermine the United States’ ability to maintain an advantage in space.

In this report, the authors present methodologies for forecasting future U.S.-China space competition using open-source data and present two initial projections using these methodologies. These approaches can be used to decrease the scale and scope of future surprises and help the United States avoid falling behind in key areas of active space competition. With appropriate additional tuning, the methodologies could be extended to additional missions or research domains or matured into production-quality tools. Although it is not possible to avoid surprise entirely, forecasts such as these can help U.S. planners secure an incontrovertible advantage in space.

Key Takeaways

  • The results from regression analyses indicated that it is unlikely, but not impossible, for China to surpass the United States in total annual launches by 2030 (about a 20 percent chance). This probability increases by 2034 in a scenario in which U.S. capability trends decline or stagnate across key inputs of space competitiveness.
  • The United States maintains a larger lead in payload multiplexing—placing multiple satellites on a single booster—than launch cadence. China is lagging in this area, which suggests a greater U.S. advantage in fielding more payloads per launch as opposed to generating more launches per year when it comes to the ability to deploy more capability more quickly.
  • The results from the topic-modeling of Chinese-language space research showed that propulsion or spacelift has been and is likely to remain the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) top aerospace engineering R&D interest, but manufacturing research has rapidly risen to second place. The data suggest that the PLA’s interest in manufacturing is focused on additive manufacturing, which could reduce space mission costs or ease logistical burdens.
  • With appropriate additional tuning, both methodologies developed by the authors could be extended to additional missions or research domains or matured into production-quality tools.

Recommendations

  • Maintain or increase programs that facilitate academic collaboration, maintain or grow national investments in space R&D activities, and stimulate overall economic activity. The authors’ quantitative analysis shows how the United States’ advantage in spacelift, which undergirds the rest of the country’s space capabilities, stems from maintaining such key inputs. Any cuts to those inputs will facilitate China’s efforts to catch up with the United States’ capabilities.
  • Sustain focus on and investment in novel manufacturing techniques to counter China’s increased military investments in this aspect of space R&D. Innovations that make it easier to design, produce, and deploy space assets can provide an important tailwind for U.S. space activities.
  • Prioritize strategies that capitalize on the United States’ advantage in payloads per launch over strategies that rely on a lead in launch tempos. Lower costs and smaller payloads for future space capabilities could help maintain the United States’ advantage over China.
  • Maintain visibility on China’s launch trends as a way to understand blind spots, including launch vehicle characteristics. China’s investments in orbital-class solid-rocket boosters will compound the launch cadence and payload multiplexing trade-off.
  • Leverage forecasting models to reduce the likelihood and scope of surprise in space competition. This research has demonstrated that there are methodologies available to anticipate changes in overall U.S.-China space-related activities and foresee China’s research focus. These methodologies can complement existing analysis that focuses on specific changes in technology to help avoid surprise.

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Abramson, Louis, Alexis A. Blanc, Nicholas Blanchette, John Chen, Christian Kim, Baileigh McFall, Thomas Van Bibber, Maggie Habib, Garrett Hinck, and Andrew Radin, Blind Spot Indicators for Space: Methodologies for Assessing the Competitive Balance Between the United States and China. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3711-1.html.
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