The authors present risks of participating in space sector research with research institutions based in China. They describe China’s national interests in space; risks to researchers, institutions, and national governments participating in space research collaborations with China; and considerations for assessing international research collaboration opportunities.

Challenges When Collaborating with China on Space Research and Technology

Common Practices and Risks

Cortney Weinbaum, Christopher G. Pernin, Camille Reeves, Libby Weaver, Shanshan Mei

ResearchPublished May 26, 2026

The authors present risks of participating in space sector research with research institutions based in China. They describe China’s national interests in space; risks to researchers, institutions, and national governments participating in space research collaborations with China; and considerations for assessing international research collaboration opportunities.

The authors found that these arrangements can yield asymmetric outcomes: Financing is frequently conditional on the use of Chinese vendors and launch services; intellectual property (IP) rights, export rights, and data-access provisions often favor Chinese entities; and telemetry, tracking, and command or data processing may be routed through Chinese state-operated facilities. The risks also include espionage, technology theft, financial debt, and manipulation of space systems.

China advances its space research and development to the detriment of other countries’ space goals. China’s path to space power has left a trail of disappointed partner nations in its wake, producing lopsided outcomes in which partners assume financial and political risk while ceding control over infrastructure, data, and dual‑use technologies. Even institutions that choose not to collaborate can face espionage and cyber threats, underscoring the need for rigorous due diligence, legal review, and cybersecurity safeguards in all space-related activities involving China.

Key Takeaways

  • Foreign partners sometimes gain less control and fewer net benefits than expected, such as losing operational authority over satellites and ground stations and facing constrained access to data, spectrum, and orbital slots. Late-stage, dual-use research and development is especially prone to diversion into People’s Liberation Army applications.
  • Institutions that do not partner with China are not insulated from risk: China and its proxies have targeted foreign space organizations with espionage, insider threats, and cyber operations to obtain sensitive IP and operational access.
  • Government, commercial, and academic researchers should approach space cooperation with China with rigorous due diligence—subjecting contracts to independent legal and technical review; reconciling multilingual texts; clearly defining scope and deliverables; specifying ownership of IP, data, and infrastructure; and building in robust cybersecurity and insider-risk safeguards from the outset.

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Weinbaum, Cortney, Christopher G. Pernin, Camille Reeves, Libby Weaver, and Shanshan Mei, Challenges When Collaborating with China on Space Research and Technology: Common Practices and Risks. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4104-2.html.
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