In August 2025, the authors conducted a tabletop exercise to evaluate requirements for salvaging and repairing battle-damaged Arleigh Burke–class guided missile destroyers in the Indo-Pacific region. The exercise focused on necessary repair capabilities, command-and-control arrangements, and partner nations’ roles. The authors highlight their findings and present recommendations for how the U.S. Navy and allies can prepare for and engage in battle-damage repairs during a conflict.

Battle Damage Repair for Arleigh Burke–Class Destroyers

Tabletop Exercise Results

Bradley Martin, David A. Shlapak, Angela Yun, Grace Carter, Katherine Anna Trauger, Tyler Hoard

ResearchPublished May 27, 2026

The Arleigh Burke–class guided missile destroyer, commonly known as a DDG-51, is the primary surface combatant vessel of the U.S. Navy. These ships—designed to operate in contested environments—are likely to sustain widespread battle damage from diverse attacks should a conflict develop in the Indo-Pacific region. The prevalent nature of this damage would give rise to the greatest demand for ship repair that the Navy has experienced since World War II.

To evaluate requirements for and potential issues with a significant demand for salvaging and repairing battle-damaged destroyers, the authors conducted a tabletop exercise on August 13–14, 2025, with participants from the United States and allied nations in the Indo-Pacific. The participants were split into four groups, and each group represented U.S. and allied stakeholders who would be involved in the repairs.

The exercise involved four vignettes in which ships, including DDG-51s, were damaged and required repair. The exercise focused on the capabilities required to salvage and repair the ships, the implied command-and-control (C2) arrangements, partner nations’ roles, and key organic capabilities that the U.S. Navy could deploy and develop.

In this report, the authors provide the background and details of the tabletop exercise, and they highlight their findings from the participants’ discussions. The authors also present recommendations for how the U.S. Navy and partner nations can prepare for and engage in battle-damage repairs during a conflict.

Key Takeaways

  • Existing U.S. Navy systems for battle-damage repair are burdened by outdated peacetime frameworks and ambiguous C2 structures during conflict.
  • Presumptive expectations concerning even close allies’ abilities and willingness to support extensive repairs might be unrealistic. Participants from allied nations were clear in their support of alliance commitments, but they noted that most repair facilities are in significantly vulnerable areas. It is not clear whether the United States could rely on partners without formal alliance ties to support U.S. actions beyond brief stops for voyage repairs.
  • Although the Navy has organic repair capabilities, these capabilities are sufficient only for limited repairs to combat systems and repairs that allow ships to transit back to the United States.
  • Poor availability of necessary parts might cause significant delays, which could occur even if a host nation has agreed to provide more-substantive repair support.

Recommendations

  • The U.S. Navy should institutionalize C2 by clarifying authority, streamlining communications, and defining approval chains during crisis and conflict.
  • The U.S. Navy should expand organic repair capabilities and ensure that all deployed personnel are familiar with rapidly deploying those capabilities.
  • The U.S. Navy should negotiate detailed support agreements with regional partners and exercise repair procedures without access to key ports.
  • The U.S. Navy should reconstitute critical parts and a skilled workforce to prioritize operational flexibility over peacetime efficiency.
  • The U.S. Navy should anchor exercises to strategic objectives, prioritizing assured force regeneration, tactical resilience, and alliance interoperability.
  • Allies and partners should negotiate pre-event legal and policy frameworks to clarify the support that the Navy can expect at each escalation stage and incorporate the frameworks into operational planning.
  • Allies and partners should maintain updated bilateral capabilities assessments, prioritizing information-sharing so both sides have an actionable understanding during a crisis.
  • Allies and partners should, for future wargames, include realistic scenarios and emphasize a mutual understanding of C2, information-sharing, and allied support during high-threat situations.
  • Allies and partners should codevelop host-nation resilience and continuity plans that focus on port and repair facilities, distributed repair nodes, and partner-specific continuity-of-operations plans.
  • Allies and partners should advance multinational pre-positioning of repair packages with clear protocols for accelerated access during a crisis to avoid diplomatic bottlenecks.

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Martin, Bradley, David A. Shlapak, Angela Yun, Grace Carter, Katherine Anna Trauger, and Tyler Hoard, Battle Damage Repair for Arleigh Burke–Class Destroyers: Tabletop Exercise Results. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA470-9.html.
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This research was sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Sustainment’s Product Support office. This work was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division.

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