Robust and reliable access to energy is fundamental for the continued rollout of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure. However, many critical energy-related supply chains face vulnerabilities. The authors identify the electrical equipment needed for AI data center operations, the supply chain vulnerabilities of this equipment, and the impact of those vulnerabilities on the U.S. power grid’s ability to meet AI demand by 2030.

Supply Chain, Energy, and AI Nexus

Evaluating AI Energy Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Ismael Arciniegas Rueda, Rahim Ali, Frank Andujar Lugo, Karishma V. Patel, Robin Wang

ResearchPublished Jun 25, 2026

The anticipated growth in artificial intelligence (AI) development requires additional power capacity. More than half of North America faces a substantial risk of energy shortfalls within the next five to ten years, the result of increasing electricity demand from data centers, decarbonization through electrification, and industrial growth. Although many initiatives to increase generation capacity are in progress, the pace of these efforts may pose challenges in terms of meeting future energy demands. And progress can be hindered by supply chain vulnerabilities in the procurement of critical electrical equipment front-of-the-meter (FTM), behind-the-meter (BTM), and off-grid (usually referred to as bridge power [BP]) projects to supply AI energy demand.

The authors identify the critical electrical equipment required for AI data center operations, the supply chain vulnerabilities of different types of relevant power equipment, and the impact of those vulnerabilities on the U.S. power grid’s ability to meet AI demand by 2030.

Key Takeaways

  • Several pieces of equipment, such as natural gas turbines, that may be required for FTM installations are also required by off-grid BP installations, which indicates that data centers cannot eliminate supply chain constraints by moving off-grid.
  • Using a composite supply chain vulnerability score, the authors determined that steam turbines, geothermal production wells, and conductors and wires were the most vulnerable equipment for FTM installations in 2025. Battery technologies and chemistries also showed elevated vulnerability.
  • For BTM, there was a concentration of backup power components at the top of the supply chain vulnerability ranking in 2025.
  • The main source of supply chain vulnerabilities varies significantly across equipment and time, which implies that effective supply chain resilience strategies must be tailored to the specific vulnerability profile of each type of equipment. For instance, turbine generators show a vulnerability mainly arising from market concentration; for transformers, the main source of vulnerability is volume volatility.
  • Supply chain–related threats to FTM components (natural gas generation, storage, transformers) have the potential to result in a decrease of approximately 7 percent to 31 percent in available net capacity by 2030 in comparison with a base case of no additional delays in the procurement of natural gas turbines, batteries, and transformers.
  • Supply chain–related threats to BTM components (batteries) have the potential to result in approximately an 8 percent decrease in available net capacity by 2030, relative to a base case of no additional delays in the procurement of BTM batteries.

Recommendations

  • The U.S. Department of Energy should implement a decision framework, such as the one provided in this report, for responding to observed supply chain vulnerabilities with proportionate policy actions.
  • The U.S. government should prioritize supply chain policy interventions in generation systems, given their more acute supply chain vulnerability with respect to transmission and critical impact across all supply options.
  • The U.S. International Trade Commission and U.S. Customs and Border Protection should work together to increase the specificity of certain Harmonized Tariff Schedules and Schedule B codes, at the ten-digit level. This report provides a list of the most supply chain–vulnerable components that could be targeted for additional trade data granularity.
  • The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and U.S. Department of Homeland Security should drive a consultative process with utilities, producers, and other government partners to ensure a common language and understanding that leads to improved visibility and coordination around supply chain risks while calibrating the potential burden of additional reporting requirements against the perceived benefits of improving decisive insights.
  • The U.S. Department of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should coordinate with utilities and large loads, such as data centers, to identify and maintain reserves of the most-critical grid components. A transparent selection process and cost recovery mechanism would ensure that these reserves enhance resilience while remaining economically sustainable.

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Arciniegas Rueda, Ismael, Rahim Ali, Frank Andujar Lugo, Karishma V. Patel, and Robin Wang, Supply Chain, Energy, and AI Nexus: Evaluating AI Energy Supply Chain Vulnerabilities. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4707-1.html.
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