Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center

Maritime Domain Awareness Market and Capability Assessments for the Department of Homeland Security

Angela Putney, Sarah Weilant, Dulani Woods, Annette Prieto

ResearchPublished Nov 19, 2026

This research was conducted within HSOAC, a federally funded research and development center operated by RAND under contract with DHS.

Multiple components in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) need comprehensive maritime domain awareness (MDA) to identify, locate, and thwart threats to national security and stop illicit activities.

DHS components face MDA capability gaps, limiting their ability to effectively carry out their missions. Achieving MDA is inherently difficult, especially when the United States has more than 95,000 miles of shoreline and 3.4 million square nautical miles of ocean under its jurisdiction. In addition, typical means of monitoring and tracking maritime activity—such as relying on vessels’ automatically transmitted location data—are often unreliable because not all vessels are required to transmit the signal or because there is intentional noncooperation. Even if additional sensors were used to track vessels, the amount of data produced makes it challenging for DHS to process the data across disparate analytic systems and inform timely action.

To help DHS improve MDA, the authors assess the state of the commercial market for MDA technologies, the existing state of DHS MDA capabilities, and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for achieving improved MDA. The authors provide their recommendations for actions that DHS can take to optimize existing and potential MDA capabilities.

Key Takeaways

  • Maritime sensor data coverage along the U.S. coastlines is inconsistent, which affects DHS’s ability to detect and track vessels, determine their intent, predict and respond to threats, and complete other aspects of components’ missions.
  • Other non-DHS federal and nonfederal sensor systems collect maritime data, but the ability to share the data is hindered by differing data formats, permissions, and classifications.
  • If existing sensor data collection increased significantly, the quantity of data would likely overwhelm the ability of existing processing systems to render the data into an actionable form. Such processing would need automation, AI, and machine learning (ML) augmentation.
  • Using an AI or ML system to predict vessel activities using sparse data would likely lead to results with a significant number of false-positive and false-negative identifications and classifications and thus be unreliable for effective operations and strategy.
  • Stakeholders anticipate that using AI could expand automated data fusion from disparate sources across DHS and partner agency systems and improve predictive threat modeling by using complex adversarial behavioral baselines to anticipate illicit activity.
  • Some cooperative arrangements among DHS components and with other agencies enable data-sharing and operational coordination across jurisdictions, which in turn allows any one entity to build a more complete picture of maritime activity than it could achieve on its own, but more such arrangements are needed.

Recommendations

  • DHS could improve data-sharing, integration, and maintenance between and across components and partners by identifying and using opportunities to improve data-sharing at the local level, within and among DHS components, and between DHS components and other federal departments and agencies.
  • DHS could establish a foundation of authoritative, enterprise‑level MDA data to support future system acquisitions and analytics that would include governance mechanisms, standardized metadata, designated data stewardship, and automated data ingestion and sharing across DHS components and other government agencies.
  • DHS could invest in automation capabilities for routine monitoring and alerts using AI or rule-based mechanisms to support timely operational cueing followed by continuous monitoring, tuning, and governing of automated systems to minimize false-positive alerts and false-negative alerts.
  • DHS could enhance coordination and governance by ensuring that appropriate staffing, training, and governance are in place to support the sustained use of shared data, analytics, and AI‑enabled MDA systems.
  • DHS could make commercial purchases of data and analytic systems at the department level to ensure that components have reasonable access to those systems.
  • DHS could improve sensor data coverage by adding more sensors.
  • DHS could enhance processing data capabilities by automating processing where possible, providing operators with alerts of possible targets, and using feedback on the accuracy of the alerts to train AI and ML systems.

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Putney, Angela, Sarah Weilant, Dulani Woods, and Annette Prieto, Maritime Domain Awareness Market and Capability Assessments for the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center operated by the RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4854-1.html.
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