Pricing Strategies for NASA Wind-Tunnel Facilities

Thomas Light, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, Jan Osburg

ResearchPublished Oct 4, 2011

Cover: Pricing Strategies for NASA Wind-Tunnel Facilities

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a large array of national-class aeronautics testing capabilities, but there has been an overall downward trend in the use of its wind-tunnel test facilities. Fiscal pressures have increased incentives to cut costs and create additional sources of revenue to sustain and expand the testing capabilities that NASA offers.

The authors explore six potential approaches to pricing the use of these facilities: (1) marginal cost pricing, (2) two-part pricing with full cost recovery, (3) two-part pricing with subsidization, (4) average cost pricing, (5) average cost pricing with subsidization, and (6) no charge. Evaluating each approach against three criteria — efficiency, fiscal impact, and fairness — the authors find that the no-charge policy performs poorly across the board and that no one strategy performs well across all three criteria. However, each of the first five options performs well against at least one criterion.

Topics

Document Details

  • Availability: Web-Only
  • Year: 2011
  • Pages: 37
  • Document Number: TR-999-NASA

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Light, Thomas, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, and Jan Osburg, Pricing Strategies for NASA Wind-Tunnel Facilities, RAND Corporation, TR-999-NASA, 2011. As of October 10, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR999.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Light, Thomas, Chad J. R. Ohlandt, and Jan Osburg, Pricing Strategies for NASA Wind-Tunnel Facilities. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR999.html.
BibTeX RIS

This report was sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and was conducted jointly in the RAND Transportation, Space, and Technology Program within RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment and the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, part of the RAND National Defense Research Institute.

This publication is part of the RAND technical report series. RAND technical reports, products of RAND from 2003 to 2011, presented research findings on a topic limited in scope or intended for a narrow audience; discussions of the methodology employed in research; literature reviews, survey instruments, modeling exercises, guidelines for practitioners and research professionals, and supporting documentation; and preliminary findings. All RAND technical reports were subject to rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.