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Simple cognitive models of the adversary are useful in a variety of domains, including national security analysis. Having alternative models can temper the tendency to base strategy on the best-estimate understanding of the adversary, and can encourage building a strategy that is better hedged and more adaptive. Best estimates of adversary thinking have often been wrong historically. Good cognitive models must avoid mirror-imaging, which implies recognizing ways in which the adversary's reasoning may be affected by history, culture, personalities, and imperfect information, as well as by objective circumstances. This paper describes a series of research efforts over three decades to build such cognitive models, some as complex computer programs and some exceptionally simple. These have been used to represent Cold-War Soviet leaders, Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il, and modern-day leaders of al Qaeda. Building such models has been a mixture of art and science, but has yielded useful insights, including insights about the sometimes-subtle influence of leaders' decision-making culture.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction

  • Chapter Two

    The Need for Cognitive Models

  • Chapter Three

    Background: Large A. I. Models in Analytic War Gaming

  • Chapter Four

    Saddam Hussein

  • Chapter Five

    Modeling North Korean Leaders in the Context of Nonproliferation Negotiations

  • Chapter Six

    Using Cognitive Models to Understand Terrorism and Public Support for Terrorism

  • Chapter Seven

    Computational Implementation of Factor Tree Models

  • Chapter Eight

    Conclusions and Suggestions for Research

This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division.

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