While U.S. President Donald Trump's messaging for Europe has been almost consistently negative, the same cannot be said for Japan. Since returning to office, his administration has been nothing but positive (apart from on tariffs) on the U.S.-Japan alliance. As encouraging as this situation may seem, past precedent should not be taken as a prediction of the future, particularly given how rapidly U.S. policy keeps changing.
In a February meeting with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Trump reiterated the United States' unwavering commitment to Japan's defense using its full range of capabilities. The two also agreed to continue to strengthen bilateral ties in a host of areas in both the military and economic domains.
Then in March, in his first visit to the Indo-Pacific since becoming the secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth offered similar reassurances to Tokyo. One item, which some reports had initially cast doubt on, was the continued commitment to upgrade the current U.S. Forces Japan command into an operational command. He also reiterated the value the United States places on Japan, saying that the two countries “stand firmly together in the face of aggressive and coercive actions by the communist Chinese.” He made similar comments again last week at the Shangri La Dialogue. Collectively, these actions look very familiar to summits and announcements by every U.S. administration this century. Importantly, they serve to allay anxieties in Tokyo about the Trump administration's commitment to the region or to Japan.
This contrasts with the state of U.S. relations with Europe, where Trump has been crafting a new approach in trans-Atlantic ties. Washington has pushed Brussels to take on more responsibility for its own defense, threatening the possibility of not defending NATO members that do not meet a defense spending threshold. And where Europeans have been seeking ways to keep the United States committed to the defense of Ukraine, they have struggled, even being kept out of the initiation of peace talks with Russia in Saudi Arabia. Collectively, U.S. efforts appear to be an attempt to transform the transatlantic relationship in profound ways. And unlike Japan, these actions foretell a distancing from Europe and NATO in particular.
The growing dissonance in the U.S.-Europe relationship has implications for Japan despite the appearance of current mutual content.
The growing dissonance in the U.S.-Europe relationship has implications for Japan despite the appearance of current mutual content. Alignment on a common threat—in this case China—helps the allies remain close. But if that priority changes, does that trickle down to the raison d'être of the alliance? And if Europe's challenge is ensuring one's defense when its primary ally appears to be hedging, Japan's concern is that on steroids.
As Europe would attest, bilateral security relations do not occur in a vacuum. Already, the European Union (along with most of the world) has been hit with 50 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum. A 20 percent tariff on all imports from the European Union has been paused until Monday. Japan is not immune and has been hit by a 24 percent tariff against all imports, also paused until Monday. It is too early to tell how these tariffs may affect bilateral ties, but the trade war is likely to seep into other aspects of the U.S-Japan relationship.
For now, Tokyo appears to accept this dual-track treatment, but can this duality endure? During four visits I made to Tokyo this year, I noticed a schism among officials. The cautiously optimistic view is that the threat China poses will ensure the United States remains committed to the region, particularly its alliance with Japan, regardless of what happens with economic ties. The other view—the guardedly pessimistic one—is that the United States has changed and is focused more on domestic issues and ready to make a deal with any country as a means to protect American interests, which could have negative tradeoffs for Japan in both the security and economic domains.
Currently, the cautious optimists have reason to relax as their perspective appears to be playing out. That said, the future holds three fundamental questions that could prove the guarded pessimists right and push the alliance into difficult territory, like we see happening with U.S.-Europe ties.
First, if the United States offers concessions to Russia on Ukraine, it would likely exacerbate anxieties in Tokyo about whether Washington could do something similar to China regarding Taiwan. For now, this seems unlikely given the hard-line approach U.S. officials have taken toward China. But if the United States softens or signals disengagement on Taiwan, how will Japan view U.S. credibility and commitment to the alliance and to the region?
Second, people interviewed for top administration positions have called on Japan to increase its defense spending, echoing similar demands made of NATO allies. This is something already proving difficult for Tokyo as it struggles to pay for current defense increases amid a slowing economy and shrinking population. What happens should those U.S. calls become louder and more pointed? What can Tokyo expect of its ally if its contributions are habitually characterized as insufficient? Worse, because its own defense buildup is predicated on the assumptions of current U.S. military levels in the region, what implications would it have on Japan's plans if the United States threatens to reduce its current force posture as a means to force change in Tokyo?
Finally, the biggest possible challenge for Japan is if Washington begins to call into question Japan's role in the alliance.
The biggest possible challenge for Japan is if Washington begins to call into question Japan's role in the alliance.
Already, Trump has remarked about the unfair nature of the alliance, saying that “we have an interesting deal with Japan that we have to protect them, but they don't have to protect us.” What recourse does Japan have should the United States seek to dramatically alter the alliance framework? Neither the alliance nor Japan's domestic laws were designed for Japan to defend the United States automatically without conditions, like NATO's Article V. It did, however, enact a suite of laws in 2015 to address just that.
Still, any support is likely to be constrained to specific situations and to the region, not the continental United States This is problematic because European leaders may have the option to declare strategic independence from the United States, while Japan has no Plan B.
The future is not set, but the past sets some form of precedent, regardless of how faint the shadow of determination may be. If questions over trust or the credibility of the United States start to seep into one aspect of the relationship, there is nothing to prevent those questions from affecting other areas. Whether this will prompt Japan to reassess its strategies remains to be seen.
