Cover: Team Pay for Performance

Team Pay for Performance

Experimental Evidence from the Round Rock Pilot Project on Team Incentives

Published In: Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, v. 34, no. 4, Dec. 2012, p. 367-390

Posted on 2012

by Matthew G. Springer, John F. Pane, Vi-Nhuan Le, Daniel F. McCaffrey, Susan Freeman Burns, Laura S. Hamilton, Brian M. Stecher

Education policymakers have shown increased interest in incentive programs for teachers based on the outcomes of their students. This article examines a program in which bonuses were awarded to teams of middle school teachers based on their collective contribution to student test score gains. The study employs a randomized controlled trial to examine effects of the bonus program over the course of an academic year, with the experiment repeated a second year, and finds no significant effects on the achievement of students or the attitudes and practices of teachers. The lack of effects of team-level pay for performance in this study is consistent with other recent experiments studying the short-term effects of bonus awards for individual performance or whole-school performance.

This report is part of the RAND external publication series. Many RAND studies are published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, as chapters in commercial books, or as documents published by other organizations.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.