Report
From Insurgency to Stability
Sep 7, 2011
Volume I: Key Capabilities and Practices
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This monograph is the first of two volumes that examine how countries confronting insurgencies transition from a high level of violence to a more stable situation. It identifies the procedures and capabilities that the U.S. Department of Defense, other agencies of the U.S. government, U.S. allies and partners, and international organizations require in order to support the transition from counterinsurgency to stability and reconstruction operations. During counterinsurgency, the military takes primary responsibility for security and economic operations, but when the insurgency has been reduced to a level where the state is able to perform its basic functions, police and civilian government agencies take the lead in providing security and services to the population. Successful post-counterinsurgency operations can ensure that lasting peace and stability will follow, rather than a relapse into violence.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
U.S. Interagency Planning and Implementation — Vision and Reality in 2010
Chapter Three
Military-to-Civilian Hand-Off of Security and Economic Operations
Chapter Four
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
Chapter Five
Police and Justice Functions
Chapter Six
The Contribution of International Partners
Chapter Seven
Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendix A
U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Implementing or Supporting Policing Capabilities
Appendix B
U.S. Government Agencies Involved in Building or Supporting Justice and Corrections Capabilities
Appendix C
Key Capabilities of U.S. Government Agencies
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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