The Long March

Building an Afghan National Army

Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, Brian Grady

ResearchPublished May 13, 2009

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is critical to the success of the allied efforts in Afghanistan and the ultimate stability of the national government. This monograph assesses the ANA's progress in the areas of recruitment, training, facilities, and operational capability. It draws on a variety of sources: in-country interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials; data provided by the U.S. Army; open-source literature; and a series of public opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan over the past several years. Although the ANA has come a long way since the outset of the recent conflict in the country, the authors conclude that coalition forces, especially those of the United States, will play a crucial role in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, particularly in light of the increased threat from Taliban forces and other illegally armed criminal groups.

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  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2009
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 84
  • Paperback Price: $31.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-4668-0
  • Document Number: MG-845-RDCC/OSD

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RAND Style Manual
Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady, The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army, RAND Corporation, MG-845-RDCC/OSD, 2009. As of October 10, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG845.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Younossi, Obaid, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady, The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG845.html. Also available in print form.
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Research conducted by

The research described in this report was jointly sponsored by the Royal Danish Defence College and RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

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