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Successful counterinsurgency (COIN) requires the integration of security and civil COIN to create conditions that allow the population to choose between the government and insurgents, eliminate the grievances that gave rise to the insurgency, and present the population with choices that are more attractive than what the insurgents can offer. Building on a framework for integrating civil and military counterinsurgency first described in Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency, this volume presents an approach to the civil component of counterinsurgency that builds on detailed background, context analysis, and threat analysis to identify and develop critical civil COIN activities. It illustrates this approach using three case studies: Nangarhar province in Afghanistan, Nord-Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Al Anbar province in Iraq. The approach builds on the best aspects of existing conflict assessment methodologies and adds new elements developed specifically for this project. The resulting framework goes beyond the strategic and operational decisions related to designing a program that is appropriate for a given conflict context.

The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

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