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The roles and responsibilities of defense acquisition officers and Department of Defense (DoD) chief information officers are governed by U.S. laws and specified in more detail by a growing and complex body of DoD policy. The authors identify policy governing the design, acquisition, and integration of information technology (IT) and national security systems (NSS) that could lead to potential conflicts among these executives when they exercise their duties in the defense acquisition system. They examine the sources of these conflicts, and find that conflicts in the DoD acquisition process have occurred in the areas of setting IT standards and developing an IT architecture. Recent changes in DoD policy have reduced the potential for conflict in IT architecture development; however, the potential for conflict remains in the DoD standard-setting process. The authors recommend changes to DoD policy that can resolve these conflicts.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction

  • Chapter Two

    The Defense Acquisition Executive

  • Chapter Three

    Chief Information Officer

  • Chapter Four

    Architecture R&R Defined in the United States Code

  • Chapter Five

    Comparison of DAE and CIO Roles and Responsibilities

  • Chapter Six

    Findings

  • Chapter Seven

    Recommendations

  • Appendix A

    Definitions of IT and NSS in the USC

  • Appendix B

    Overview of DoD Directives and Instructions

  • Appendix C

    CIO R&R in USC but Not Considered Relevant

  • Appendix D

    Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009

The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Navy. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

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