This essay examines a number of issues concerning the status of al Qaeda more than ten years after 9/11, including whether America has won the operational battle but lost the ideological contest; whether homegrown terrorism is a growing threat; whether maintaining American troops in Afghanistan is essential; and whether the United States ought to declare on its own an end to the war on al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade

Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory?

Brian Michael Jenkins

ResearchPublished Feb 16, 2012

More than ten years after 9/11, there is still remarkable lack of consensus among analysts' assessments of al Qaeda's current condition and future capabilities. Almost every issue is debated: Whether America has won the operational battle but lost the ideological contest; whether homegrown terrorism is a growing threat; whether maintaining American troops in Afghanistan is essential; whether the United States ought to declare on its own an end to the war on al Qaeda. Part of the debate is driven by political agendas, but the arguments derive from the fact that al Qaeda is many things at once and must be viewed in all of its various dimensions. This essay examines a number of these issues in light of recent developments — the death of Osama bin Laden, the Arab Spring, and the American withdrawal from Iraq. In each case, it drives toward a bottom line. In the final analysis, it is a personal view.

Key Findings

Lack of Consensus on al Qaeda's Current Condition

  • Al Qaeda's operational capabilities have been reduced.
  • The architects of 9/11 have been captured or killed.
  • Al Qaeda today is far more decentralized than it was ten years ago and far more dependent on its autonomous field commands, its affiliates, its allies, and its ability to inspire homegrown terrorists.

The Arab Spring

  • The street protests that sparked uprisings across North Africa and continue in the Middle East are changing the political landscape. The turmoil offers al Qaeda some immediate opportunities, but for the long run, it is not clear how these events will affect either al Qaeda or U.S. counterterrorist efforts.

Al Qaeda's Perception

  • Al Qaeda sees itself engaged in an existential struggle with Western infidels determined to destroy Islam.
  • Al Qaeda sees the United States as weakened economically and weary of a costly war — as the Soviet Union was before its withdrawal from Afghanistan and subsequent collapse.
  • Al Qaeda believes that its superior spiritual commitment will eventually defeat America's superior military technology.

The Situation in Afghanistan

  • Al Qaeda's leaders attribute great importance to Afghanistan because the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan provided al Qaeda's initial reason for being and because a Taliban victory is the best hope for al Qaeda's survival.
  • Either the United States will develop a less costly military strategy to contain the Taliban for a longer time or it will accept the risks associated with withdrawal from Afghanistan, because the current deployment of forces is politically unsustainable.

Order a Print Copy

Format
Paperback
Page count
32 pages
List Price
$16.00
Buy link
Add to Cart

Topics

Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 2012
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 32
  • Paperback Price: $16.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-6025-9
  • Document Number: OP-362-RC

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Jenkins, Brian Michael, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade: Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory? RAND Corporation, OP-362-RC, 2012. As of September 19, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP362.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Jenkins, Brian Michael, Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade: Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory? Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012. https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP362.html. Also available in print form.
BibTeX RIS

This Occasional Paper results from the RAND Corporation's continuing program of self-initiated research. Support for such research is provided, in part, by the generosity of RAND's donors and by the fees earned on client-funded research.

This publication is part of the RAND occasional paper series. RAND occasional papers were products of RAND from 2003 to 2013 that included informed perspectives on a timely policy issue, discussions of new research methodologies, essays, papers presented at a conference, and summaries of work in progress.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.