The Science of Gun Policy: A Critical Synthesis of Research Evidence on the Effects of Gun Policies in the United States, Fourth Edition
RAND Health Quarterly, 2024; 12(1):3
RAND Health Quarterly, 2024; 12(1):3
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More in this issueIn this study, part of RAND's Gun Policy in America initiative, researchers seek objective information about what scientific literature reveals about the likely effects of various gun laws. In the fourth edition of this study, the authors incorporate more-recent research in their synthesis of the available scientific data regarding the effects of 18 state firearm policies on firearm injuries and deaths, violent crime, suicides, the gun industry, defensive gun use, and other outcomes. By highlighting where scientific evidence is accumulating, the authors hope to build consensus around a shared set of facts that have been established through a transparent, nonpartisan, and impartial review process. In so doing, they also illuminate areas in which more and better information could make important contributions to establishing fair and effective gun policies.
In 2016, RAND launched the Gun Policy in America initiative, a unique attempt to systematically and transparently assess available scientific evidence on the real effects of gun laws and policies. Our goal has been to create resources where policymakers and the general public can access unbiased information that informs and enables the development of fair and effective policies. Through this initiative, we released the first edition of this study (RAND Corporation, 2018), which synthesized the available scientific data on the effects of 13 classes of firearm policies on firearm deaths, violent crime, the gun industry, participation in hunting and sport shooting, and other outcomes.1 In 2020, a second edition was released in which we expanded the classes of policies considered to 18, and in which we updated evidence for all laws with newly published research through 2018 (Smart et al., 2020). A third edition updated our findings and conclusions with research published through October 2020 (Smart et al., 2023). This fourth edition updates our findings and conclusions with research published through February 2023.
We followed similar systematic review procedures used for the third edition of this study (Smart et al., 2023). We focused on the empirical literature assessing the effects of 18 classes of firearm policies on any of eight outcomes, which include both public health outcomes and outcomes of concern to many gun owners. We reviewed scientific studies that have been published since 1995, a date chosen to correspond to when such econometric tools as cluster adjustment for serial correlation in panel data—which are now understood to be critically important for estimating the significance of the effects of gun policies—became available in standard statistical packages (Aneja, Donohue, and Zhang, 2014; Helland and Tabarrok, 2004; Schell, Griffin, and Morral, 2018). Our results for this fourth edition now cover the literature published between January 1995 and February 2023.
The 18 classes of gun policies considered in this research are as follows:
Policies regulating who may legally own, purchase, or possess firearms
Policies regulating firearm sales and transfers
Policies regulating the legal use, storage, or carrying of firearms
The eight outcomes considered in this research are as follows:
Building on our earlier review (Smart et al., 2023) and using standardized, explicit, and pre-registered criteria for determining the strength of evidence that individual studies provide for the effects of gun policies, we produced research syntheses that describe the quality and findings of the best available scientific evidence.2 Each synthesis defines the class of policies being considered; presents and rates the available evidence; and describes what conclusions, if any, can be drawn about the policy's effects on outcomes.
In many cases, we were unable to identify any research that met our criteria for considering a study as providing minimally persuasive evidence for a policy's effects. Studies were excluded from this review if they offered only weak correlational evidence for a possible causal effect of the law, such as showing that states with a specific law had lower firearm suicides at a single point in time than states without such a law. Correlations like these can occur for many reasons other than the effects of a single law, so this kind of evidence provides little information about the effects attributable to specific laws. We did not exclude studies on the basis of their findings, only on the basis of their methods for isolating causal effects. Specifically, our methodological inclusion criteria required, at a minimum, that studies include time-series data and use such data to establish that policies preceded their apparent effects (a requirement for a causal effect) and that studies include a control or comparison group (to demonstrate that the purported causal effect was not found among those who were not exposed to the policy).
For studies that met our inclusion criteria, we summarized key findings and methodological weaknesses, when present, and provide our consensus judgment on the overall strength of the available scientific evidence. We did this by establishing the following relativistic scale describing the strength of available evidence:
These ratings are meant to describe the relative strengths of evidence available across gun policy research domains and should not be interpreted as ratings of our absolute confidence in the reported effects. For instance, when we find supportive evidence for the conclusion that CAP laws reduce self-inflicted injuries and deaths, we do not mean to suggest that it is comparable to the evidence available in more-developed fields of social science. That is, in comparison with the evidence that smoking causes cancer, for example, the evidence base in gun policy research is very limited. Additionally, our ratings reflect the relative strength of evidence within a particular outcome domain. For example, a designation of limited evidence of the effects of a given policy on suicide may represent a stronger body of evidence than a designation of limited evidence of the effects of that same policy on mass shootings because of the particular challenges that arise in evaluating policy effects for sparse outcomes (such as mass shootings; Smart and Schell, 2021). Nevertheless, we believe that such research may be valuable to the public and policymakers to understand which existing laws have more or less persuasive evidence concerning the effects the laws are likely to produce.
Table 1 summarizes our evidence ratings for all policy and outcome pairings. Several outcomes show multiple ratings, and these correspond to different characterizations of the specific policy-outcome association. For instance, we identified limited evidence that waiting periods reduce total suicides and moderate evidence that they reduce firearm suicides.
Rather than concerning how strong a policy's effects are, our findings concern the strength of the available scientific evidence that examines those effects. Thus, even when the available evidence is limited, the actual effect of the policy may be strong. Presumably, every policy has some effect on a range of outcomes, however small or unintended. Until researchers are able to design studies that can detect these effects—studies that may require data that are not currently collected in a reliable way—available evidence is likely to remain inconclusive or limited. Furthermore, unless multiple jurisdictions have implemented a policy and sufficient time has elapsed for outcome data to become available, rigorous and generalizable evidence on the policy's effects is likely to be limited. But concluding that there is limited evidence on the effects of some policies should not be confused with the conclusion that the policies themselves have limited effects. They may or may not have the effects they were designed to produce; available scientific research cannot yet answer that question. Moreover, even a policy with a small effect may nevertheless be beneficial to society or worth its costs. For instance, a policy that reduces firearm deaths by just a few percentage points could save more than 1,000 lives per year. This kind of “small” effect might be very difficult to detect with existing study methods but could represent an important contribution to public health and safety.
Of more than 200 combinations of policies and outcomes that we considered, we found that there is growing evidence to support the effects of certain policies on firearm deaths and crime, but many areas have received little methodologically rigorous investigation. Looking across the columns in Table 1, it is apparent that research into five outcomes is either unavailable or almost entirely inconclusive. It is noteworthy that three of these five outcomes—defensive gun use, hunting and recreation, and the gun industry—are issues of particular concern to gun owners or gun industry stakeholders, such as firearm manufacturers, firearm dealers, hunting outfitters, and firing ranges. The lack of research on a wide range of outcomes makes it difficult or impossible to conduct a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the gun policies. For instance, some of the strongest evidence we found suggests that CAP laws could reduce firearm injuries or deaths among children. But restricting access to guns could also prevent gun owners from accessing their weapons in an emergency. The lack of research on defensive gun use means that we do not have a way of directly estimating how the benefits of these laws (in terms of the number of child lives saved) compare with the possible costs (in terms of forgone opportunities for self-defense).
In the section that follows, we summarize the key conclusions and recommendations that can be drawn from the policy-outcome combinations with the strongest available evidence (conclusions 1 through 11). Thereafter, we draw conclusions and recommendations concerning how to improve evidence on the effects of gun policies (conclusions 12 through 16).
Our first set of conclusions and recommendations describes the policy-outcome combinations with the strongest available evidence as identified through our review of the existing literature and recommendations for policy based on this evidence.
Conclusion 1. We find supportive evidence, our highest evidence rating, that CAP laws, or safe-storage laws, reduce self-inflicted fatal or nonfatal firearm injuries, unintentional firearm injuries and deaths, and firearm homicides among youth. There is also moderate evidence that CAP laws reduce firearm suicides among young people, and limited evidence that such laws reduce unintentional firearm injuries among adults. The evidence is stronger for negligent-storage laws than for reckless endangerment laws; reckless endangerment laws are sometimes considered a weaker form of CAP law.
Conclusion 2. There is supportive evidence that stand-your-ground laws are associated with increases in firearm homicides and in total homicides.
Conclusion 3. There is supportive evidence that shall-issue laws increase total homicides, firearm homicides, and overall violent crime. There is also moderate evidence that shall-issue laws lead to an increase in rates of assault and limited evidence that they increase rates of robbery. Finally, there is limited evidence that permitless-carry laws—which are arguably a form of shall-issue law and are often implemented while maintaining a shall-issue licensing system to ensure license reciprocity with other states—lead to increases in fatal police shootings.
Conclusion 4. There is supportive evidence that increasing the minimum age required to purchase a firearm above the threshold set by federal law can reduce firearm suicides among young people. There is also limited evidence that higher minimum age requirements for purchasing or possessing a firearm may reduce total suicides among young adults and firearm suicides among young people.
Conclusion 5. There is moderate evidence that state laws establishing firearm prohibitions for individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders decrease total and firearm-related intimate partner homicides, and there is limited evidence that laws prescribing a mechanism for ensuring the surrender of firearms by prohibited possessors, when combined with laws expanding the class of prohibited possessors, reduce intimate partner homicides.
Conclusion 6. There is moderate evidence that dealer background checks reduce firearm homicides, moderate evidence that background checks on both dealer and private sales reduce total homicides, and limited evidence that background checks on private sales reduce firearm homicides.
Conclusion 7. There is moderate evidence that waiting periods reduce firearm suicides and total homicides and limited evidence that they reduce total suicides and firearm homicides.
Conclusion 8. There is limited evidence that extreme-risk protection order (ERPO) laws may reduce total and firearm suicides.
Conclusion 9. There is limited evidence that laws prohibiting the purchase or possession of guns by individuals with histories of adjudicated mental illness or incapacity reduce violent crime.
Conclusion 10. The sparseness of mass shooting data creates challenges for drawing strong inferences about policy effects because it is difficult to detect signal from noise, and low statistical power means that real policy effects are unlikely to be detected as statistically significant and significant effects are likely to be exaggerated in magnitude and may even be wrong-signed. With these caveats, we find limited evidence that permit-to-purchase requirements and bans on high-capacity magazines may reduce mass shootings and their associated fatalities.
Conclusion 11. No studies meeting our inclusion criteria have examined the effects of lost or stolen firearm reporting requirements or laws allowing armed staff in K–12 schools. Only inconclusive evidence exists for the effects of gun-free zones; firearm safety training requirements; firearm sales reporting, recording, and registration requirements; and bans on low-quality handguns.
Considering the findings from our review of the existing literature on the effects of firearm policy changes, we offer the following conclusions and recommendations for improving the evidence base on the effects of gun laws.
Conclusion 12. The modest growth in knowledge about the effects of gun policy since 1995 reflects, in part, the past reluctance of the U.S. government to sponsor work in this area at levels comparable to its investment in other areas of public safety and health, such as transportation safety or opioid overdoses. Particularly over the past decade, researchers have advanced our understanding of gun violence and policy by adopting more-rigorous methodological approaches in several areas, but sustained support of high-quality research is needed to fill gaps in the evidence base.
Conclusion 13. Rigorous research examining the effects of many state gun policies on defensive gun use, hunting and recreation, and gun industry outcomes is limited or nonexistent.
Conclusion 14. The lack of data on (1) gun ownership and availability and (2) guns in legal and illegal markets severely limits researchers' ability to determine the mechanisms by which policies have their effects, understand policy implementation and enforcement, and answer basic scientific questions about the relationships between policies, firearm availability or access, and public health and safety.
Conclusion 15. Monitoring systems for crime, victimization, and nonfatal firearm injuries are incomplete and not yet fulfilling their promise of supporting high-quality gun policy research in the areas we investigated.
Conclusion 16. While a growing number of studies are using more-rigorous methods to evaluate the causal effects of gun policies, the overall methodological quality of research on firearms can be significantly improved.
In conclusion, the evidence base has grown substantially since the publication of the first edition of this study, and there are now several policy areas for which we have more robust evidence of the effects—beneficial or harmful—on at least some outcomes. In light of this evidence, decisionmakers may want to reconsider their existing policy regimes and reflect on whether changes to policy are warranted. Political or contextual considerations, as well as ongoing Second Amendment litigation, may make some policy options more feasible or attractive than others. Additionally, because we have limited or nonexistent evidence for how these policies will affect many outcomes that are important to stakeholders, decisions will have to be made without a robust empirical understanding of the potential trade-offs. As evidence mounts in certain areas, however, decisionmakers should take that evidence into consideration.
Still, there is a surprisingly limited base of rigorous scientific evidence concerning the effects of many commonly discussed gun policies. This does not mean that these policies are ineffective; the policies themselves might well be quite effective. Instead, it reflects (1) the absence of scientific study of these policies, (2) insufficient variation in the policies across jurisdictions or over time so as to draw rigorous generalizable insights, (3) inadequate data infrastructure to evaluate effects on important outcomes, or (4) methodological shortcomings in the existing literature that limit rigorous understanding of policy effects. In addition, our review did not cover the full range of policy levers available but rather focused on a set of policies that have been implemented in the U.S. context and, therefore, have proven to be politically and legally feasible, at least in some places. This decision meant that none of the policies we examined would dramatically increase or decrease the stock of guns or gun ownership rates in ways that might produce more readily detectable effects on public safety, health, and industry outcomes. The United States has a large stock of privately owned guns in circulation, estimated to be somewhere between 265 million and 393 million firearms (Karp, 2018; Azrael et al., 2017; Cook and Goss, 2014). Laws designed to change who may buy new weapons, what weapons they may buy, or how gun sales occur will predictably have only a small effect on, for example, homicides or participation in sport shooting, which are affected much more by the existing stock of firearms. Although small effects are especially difficult to identify with the statistical methods common in this field, they may be important. Even a 1-percent reduction in homicides nationally would correspond to more than 2,000 fewer deaths over a decade.
By highlighting where scientific evidence is accumulating, we hope to build consensus around a shared set of facts that have been established through a transparent, nonpartisan, and impartial review process. In so doing, we also mean to highlight areas where more and better information could make important contributions to establishing fair and effective gun policies.
This research was supported by a grant from Arnold Ventures and conducted by the Justice Policy Program within RAND Social and Economic Well-Being.
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