Modeling and Forecasting the Demand for Aircraft Recoverable Spare Parts
Jan 1, 1993
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The Air Force generally overinvests in aircraft recoverable spare parts. In the mid-to-late 1980s, it spent roughly $5 billion annually on these resources, about $3 billion for spares and about $2 billion for repair. The current spares requirements system does not account for many of the uncertainties implicit in requirements estimation, nor for many of the management adaptations that are routinely practiced. This report concludes that substantial cost reductions could be achieved, while maintaining traditional levels of system performance, through the following: (a) modifications to the spares and repair requirements estimation system, (b) initiatives to enhance the responsiveness of depot-level component repair, (c) a massive, intensive effort to clean up the requirements database and maintain it through a system of audits, (d) consolidation of war readiness spares, and (e) technical improvements to the estimation methodology.
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