Maritime Tactical Command and Control Analysis of Alternatives
ResearchPublished Aug 29, 2016
This report is about software systems that support situational awareness and command and control (C2) for the U.S. Navy. Specifically, this report provides the results of an analysis of alternatives for the follow-on to the Navy's Global C2 system Maritime (GCCS-M), and quantifies performance of mission tasks, cost, and analyzes risk for new systems that incorporate cloud technologies afloat and ashore.
ResearchPublished Aug 29, 2016
This analysis of alternatives (AoA) is about a software system the U.S. Navy will need to support situational awareness and command and control (C2) afloat and ashore. Specifically, the RAND Corporation was tasked by the Chief of Navy Operations (OPNAV N2N6F4) to conduct an AoA, set forth by the director, for the follow-on to Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) called Maritime Tactical Command and Control (MTC2). MTC2 is a new maritime C2 program of record in Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. The alternatives for MTC2 range from maintaining the current legacy system to new development that integrates with a Navy cloud that intends to bring big data techniques to the fleet. In this report, we analyzed four of the potential alternatives within this range. Alternative 1 would maintain the status-quo GCCS-M system that is already fielded afloat and ashore. Alternative 2 builds on the status quo by integrating and enhancing capabilities from the Command and Control Rapid Prototyping Continuum (C2RPC) applications. Alternative 3 is focused on new developments that provide the capabilities of the second alternative and also takes advantage of a shore-based cloud. Alternative 4 is also focused on new developments that take advantage of a shore-based cloud, and it also relies on an afloat cloud called the Navy Tactical Cloud. This analysis covers four distinct areas: performance modeling, cost analysis, a risk assessment, and an information assurance evaluation. Based on these efforts, Alternative 4 is recommended.
This research was sponsored by the Department of the Navy, and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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