Assessing Aegis Program Transition to an Open-Architecture Model
ResearchPublished May 3, 2013
To reduce the costs of maintaining the Aegis system, and to take advantage of rapidly evolving commercial computing technology, the U.S. Navy is moving toward open-architecture software, a common source code library, and commercial, off-the-shelf processors. This report examines the potential benefits of this new model, the pace of upgrades, and the best way for the Navy to maximize the technological and financial benefits.
ResearchPublished May 3, 2013
Aegis is a highly integrated U.S. Navy combat system with anti-air warfare, ballistic missile defense, surface, subsurface, and strike roles that is currently operating on 84 ships. To reduce the costs of maintaining the system, and to take advantage of rapidly evolving commercial computing technology, the Navy is moving Aegis toward open-architecture software, a common source code library, and commercial, off-the-shelf processors. As it moves forward in implementing its integrated weapon system (IWS) model for the development, integration, and testing of upgrades to the Aegis weapon system, the Navy must consider the impact of this plan on Aegis facilities, personnel, and timelines. Of particular concern are the effects of new modernization and fielding rates on the technical infrastructure of the Aegis fleet. This report examines the potential benefits of the IWS model and the challenges associated with the transition from the Navy's legacy model for Aegis acquisition and development. It examines the pace of upgrades to both hardware and software and the speed with which they spread throughout the fleet. Finally, it proposes an upgrade schedule that offsets software (advanced capability builds) and hardware (technology insertions) to maximize the Navy's benefit from commercial industry's technology replacement cycle and ensure value for fixed development and testing budgets.
The research described in this report was prepared for the U.S. Navy. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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