Research Brief
Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza
Oct 18, 2017
This report describes how the Israel Defense Force evolved to meet an adaptive and determined hybrid adversary during its wars in Gaza. It then draws a series of lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force: from the importance of armored vehicles and active protection systems to the limitations of airpower in urban terrain and of conventional militaries to deter nonstate actors.
Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza
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For more than a decade now, Israel has clashed with Hamas in Gaza, in cycles of violence defined by periods of intense fighting followed by relative lulls. This report covers a five-year period of this conflict — from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 to the end of Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Drawing on primary and secondary sources and an extensive set of interviews, it analyzes how an advanced military fought a determined, adaptive, hybrid adversary. It describes how the Israel Defense Force (IDF) operationally, organizationally, and technologically evolved to meet asymmetric threats. Most broadly, this report details the IDF's increasing challenge of striking a delicate balance between the intense international legal public scrutiny and the hard operational realities of modern urban warfare. In this respect, this report's title — "From Cast Lead to Protective Edge" — captures more than just the names of the two operations that chronologically bracket its scope; it also describes the tension the IDF confronted between the military necessities driving maximalist uses of force and the political imperative for more restrained operations. This report draws a series of lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force: from the importance of armored vehicles and active protection systems to the limitations of airpower in urban terrain and of conventional militaries to deter nonstate actors.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Israel in Gaza: A Brief Background
Chapter Three
Operation Pillar of Defense, 2012
Chapter Four
Operation Protective Edge, 2014
Chapter Five
Protective Edge's Other Fronts
Chapter Six
Lessons of Israel's Experience in Protective Edge
Chapter Seven
Recommendations for the U.S. Army and the Joint Force
This research was sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office, G-8, Headquarters, Department of the Army, and conducted by the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program within the RAND Arroyo Center.
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