Chasing Multinational Interoperability
Benefits, Objectives, and Strategies
ResearchPublished Apr 8, 2020
Recent national defense policies focus on the importance of multinational interoperability to meeting U.S. defense goals. By recounting both their literature review and structured interviews with planners and Army leadership, the authors describe potential benefits of interoperability, the applicability of those benefits in particular contexts, and the significant costs and risks that investing in it might entail.
Benefits, Objectives, and Strategies
ResearchPublished Apr 8, 2020
Recent U.S. national defense policies have focused on the importance of multinational interoperability to meeting U.S. defense goals. However, even with the attention given to interoperability, the Army is still not interoperable with whom it wants, when it wants. One reason for this, the authors argue, is that policymakers do not have a precise enough understanding of why more and better interoperability is needed. In many ways, "interoperability" is a buzzword often asserted as the solution to an unexplained problem. Or worse, as a tautological argument: The need to be interoperable hinges on the fact that, historically, military forces have been rather terrible at doing so.
The authors of this report recount both their literature review and structured interviews with planners and leadership involved in multinational interoperability, focusing on describing the various benefits often ascribed to interoperability. They discuss the values of interoperability across multiple dimensions — shaping the strategic environment, increasing capabilities, and reducing resourcing demands. The authors also suggest strategies for realizing those benefits.
The authors aim to clarify the benefits of interoperability and spur conversations so that future decisionmakers can better articulate the intended rationale for investing in interoperability and better weigh the benefits against the significant costs and risks that interoperability might entail.
The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army and conducted by the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program within RAND Arroyo Center.
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