Research Brief
The Elements of Surprise
Aug 14, 2013
This report relates what professionals believe creates surprise, how they respond to it, and how the effects of surprise can be mitigated. RAND researchers interviewed representatives from 13 diverse professions and identified some common coping strategies, such as relying on past experience and trying to reduce the level of chaos in the environment.
From CEOs to Navy SEALs: How a Select Group of Professionals Prepare for and Respond to the Unexpected
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This report relates what professionals believe creates surprise, how they respond to it, and how the effects of surprise can be mitigated. To understand how different professions respond to surprise, RAND researchers developed a framework that categorizes professionals' responses to surprise in terms of the time available to respond and the level of chaos in the environment, then conducted discussions with representatives from 13 different professions, including former ambassadors, chief executive officers, military personnel, and physicians. RAND observed that the interviewees all used common coping strategies, such as relying on past experience and trying to reduce the level of chaos in the environment. However, there were also important differences in the responses taken by different types of professionals: "strategists" (e.g., CEOs and foreign service officers) focused more on controlling anger and ego, and communicating and coordinating with others, while "tacticians" (e.g., medical practitioners and SWAT team members) — who typically have a shorter response time — focused more on controlling panic and buying time. The report concludes with recommendations on how practitioners can better prepare for and respond to surprise.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Why Study Surprise?
Chapter Three
Research Objective, Definitions, and Initial Conceptual Models
Chapter Four
Research Hypotheses
Chapter Five
Research Method
Chapter Six
What Strategies Are Common Across Professions?
Chapter Seven
How Does the Level of Environmental Chaos Affect Practitioners' Responses to Surprises?
Chapter Eight
How Do Strategists Differ from Tacticians in Dealing with Surprise?
Chapter Nine
Surprise as an Opportunity
Chapter Ten
Helpful Lessons from Specific Professions
Chapter Eleven
Key Observations and Their Implications
The research described in this report was prepared for the National Reconnaissance Office. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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