To address the command and control challenges of a future conflict with Russia or China, in which command elements and communications networks could be attacked, the United States Air Force needs to consider how to reorganize its forces so that they can operate in degraded environments. In this report, the authors examine how options for the design of wing-level command and control elements for Air Mobility Command forces can meet such new demands.
Download
Download eBook for Free
Full Document
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 6.2 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Research Summary
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 0.1 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Purchase
Purchase Print Copy
| Format | List Price | Price | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add to Cart | Paperback68 pages | $25.50 | $20.40 20% Web Discount |
Research Questions
- What demands will future conflicts place on expeditionary wings?
- What alternative wing C2 constructs are feasible for expeditionary MAF forces, some potentially disaggregated, in forward areas under threat of missile attack?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of these alternative constructs?
The future command and control (C2) structure of the United States Air Force (USAF) forces must be designed to withstand and cope with attacks on U.S. capabilities and to effectively adapt to a rapidly changing battle space. A future conflict with Russia or China is likely to involve precision missile attacks on airfields, attacks on command nodes, cyberattacks, and degradations to communications systems. The implications are far reaching. They threaten the long-standing USAF principle and practice of highly centralized C2. Determining how to adapt effectively to major disruptions in communications and chains of command is, thus, a crucial consideration for the USAF going forward.
To help the USAF envision how forces should be organized to prepare for such conditions, the authors identify the demands that the USAF's emerging agility concepts will place on expeditionary wings; develop alternative wing C2 constructs for expeditionary Mobility Air Force (MAF) forces — some potentially disaggregated — in forward areas under threat of missile attack; and provide a qualitative assessment of the alternative constructs.
Key Findings
- USAF forces operating in forward areas will have to develop C2 capabilities designed to withstand attacks and to effectively adapt to a rapidly changing battlespace.
- The physical and cyber vulnerabilities of command nodes and networks will need to be accounted for.
- USAF forces must be designed to retain effective C2 in view of disruptions to communications and dispersals of forces.
- A modular approach for MAF C2 force elements provides the most flexibility, given the wide scope of the global operations that MAF forces must perform.
- New operating procedures for adaptive operations need to be standardized USAF-wide in order to maximize both force survivability and mission effectiveness.
Recommendations
- For future high-end fights, the MAF should develop a wing-level capability for C2 of independent MAF forces operating from multiple locations.
- MAF C2 force elements should be prepared to temporarily assume limited operational planning functions of higher headquarters.
- MAF C2 forces should be organized, trained, and equipped to reflect new demands in areas such as operational planning, logistics, operational deception, and recovery.
- The MAF should determine whether the communications capabilities of the command element are suited to future operating environments.
- The MAF should develop a modular approach to C2 force elements.
- The USAF should consider mechanisms to ensure integration of agility concepts and training across all major commands.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Command Challenges and Analytic Approach
Chapter Two
Future Operating Environments
Chapter Three
Force Element Options
Chapter Four
Findings and Recommendations
Research conducted by
The research reported here was commissioned by the Air Mobility Command (AMC) and conducted within the Force Modernization and Employment Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.