Download

Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.5 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 Format Price
Add to Cart Paperback42 pages $23.00

Research Questions

  1. How have advancements in biotechnology affected warfighting, and how could they do so in the future?
  2. Can the human body itself be a warfighting domain? Can the body itself be an offensive or defensive weapon?

A complex, high-threat landscape is emerging in which future wars might be fought with humans controlling hyper-sophisticated machines with their thoughts; the military-industrial base is disturbed by synthetically generated, genomically targeted plagues; and the future warfighter goes beyond the baseline genome to become an enhanced warfighter who is capable of survival in the harshest of combat environments.

The authors of this report examine the existing and potential future uses of biotechnology in warfare and battle and look at the human body as a warfighting domain. They envision a future in which biotechnology is used by both state and nonstate actors to affect warfighting. Sophisticated future actors may use pathogens, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), genomic enhancements, and wearable technology to supplement and strengthen warfighters.

Key Findings

  • Several countries have advantages—when compared with the United States—in their abilities to deal with the effects of a globally released, person-to-person transmissible bioweapon.
  • State actors are more likely to use person-to-person transmissible bioweapons than they are to use nontransmissible ones because it is inherently difficult to identify the natural or artificial origins of person-to-person transmissible pathogens.
  • Internet of Bodies (IoB) technology will continue to advance, and the United States must be especially cognizant that any deployed technology can also be hacked.
  • Genomic surveillance is the most likely near-term technology to affect warfighting, but genomic enhancement could have profound consequences should it become more feasible technically.
  • State actors may find the inherent ambiguity of origins for person-to-person transmissible pathogens to be a strategic asset.

Recommendations

  • Governments should revise the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to include strong protections, such as independent monitoring of biosafety level (BSL)–rated laboratories in a manner akin to chemical and nuclear weapons treaties. Failing BWC revisions, the United States should pursue stronger bilateral agreements for biosafety.
  • Governments should continue scrutinizing adversary biotechnology advancements to identify and publicize BWC violations.
  • Members of Congress should resist anti-vaccine populism that is at the expense of military readiness.
  • The U.S. government should continue to be vigilant about entities that misuse biotechnologies and should continue working to enhance the information security of IoB devices.
  • Stakeholders should focus the allocation of funding on projects to identify and manage risks and opportunities arising from genomic surveillance.
  • DoD should develop clear guidance on integrating biological warfighting capabilities.
  • DoD should develop warfighting conventions on the use of IoB devices, particularly BCIs.
  • DoD should develop ways to employ genomic surveillance for improvements in military personnel selection or assignments.
  • Stakeholders should research mitigation strategies for novel pathogen potentialities to anticipate and counter adversary biotechnology threats.

This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Program of the RAND National Security Research Division.

This report is part of the RAND research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.