Leveraging the Federal Select Agent Program to Oversee Nucleic Acids
Volume 1, Analysis of Opportunities to Control Genomes, Genes, and Gene Fragments Through the Federal Select Agent Program’s Authorities
ResearchPublished Aug 24, 2026
The increasing availability of synthetic genetic materials may pose public health risks that may warrant new approaches to ensuring that certain materials are accessible only to researchers who will use them responsibly. The authors examine whether genetic components of microorganisms or toxins that are not currently regulated by the Federal Select Agent Program could be brought under program oversight.
Volume 1, Analysis of Opportunities to Control Genomes, Genes, and Gene Fragments Through the Federal Select Agent Program’s Authorities
ResearchPublished Aug 24, 2026
More individuals than ever before have access to the reagents and techniques needed to develop lifesaving medicines, materials with new and useful properties, and innovative approaches to producing complicated chemistries. This democratization has also increased the risk of malign or irresponsible use of these technologies. In particular, the increasing availability of synthetic genetic materials may pose public health risks ranging from the synthesis of novel dangerous viruses or the enhancement of other microorganisms. This may warrant new approaches to ensuring that certain genetic materials are accessible only to researchers who will use them responsibly
This is the first volume of a report in which the authors consider whether genetic components of microorganisms or toxins that are not currently regulated by the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) could be brought under FSAP oversight. This volume includes in-depth analyses of the statutory and regulatory landscapes in which expanded FSAP oversight of certain new genetic elements may be possible but does not include a thorough assessment of how the regulatory options affect the public health risks or the life science research ecosystem, which will be addressed in Volume 2.
This research was independently initiated and conducted by the Center on AI, Security, and Technology within RAND Global and Emerging Risks using income from operations and gifts and grants from philanthropic supporters.
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