China's Local Government Debt

Implications for U.S.-China Competition

Howard J. Shatz, Robin Wang, Linda Zhang, Timothy R. Heath, Anthony D'Arrigo

ResearchPublished Oct 26, 2026

This research was independently initiated and made possible by RAND's own resources, including income from operations, unrestricted gifts from RAND supporters, and distributions from its long-term investment fund.

In response to the global financial crisis that began in 2008, China unleashed a debt-fueled stimulus to maintain growth and employment. Although the global financial crisis has come and gone, debt-fueled growth has not. One measure of credit registered China’s debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio at 315 percent in June 2025. Much of this debt is tied to local governments, which manage about 85 percent of government spending but face a persistent mismatch between their spending responsibilities and revenue. That mismatch has worsened as land sales—one of their largest locally generated revenue sources—have sharply declined because of a downturn in the property sector.

The authors of this report examine the profile, scale, and consequences of China’s local government debt. They estimate that local government debt reached at least $12 trillion in 2024, or 64 percent of China’s GDP, including more than $5 trillion in off-balance-sheet borrowing. They also investigate recent debt-resolution measures and argue that these steps can buy time but do not resolve the underlying fiscal imbalances. The authors assess the implications of this debt for China’s economy, public services, and political stability, and consider what it means for competition between the United States and China.

Key Takeaways

  • China’s local government debt problem is a central concern among the country’s ongoing fiscal challenges and reflects a structural imbalance. Local governments manage about 85 percent of government spending, but one sizable revenue source—land sales—has sharply declined because of a downturn in the property sector.
  • Using data from the Wind Financial Terminal, the authors estimate that China’s total local government debt was at least $12 trillion in 2024—64 percent of China’s GDP. This total includes off-balance-sheet debts, which were valued at more than $5 trillion—if not more—as of December 2024, that had been accumulated through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs).
  • Banks have absorbed much of the surge in government debt (government bonds accounted for 22 percent of new bank assets over the past five years), leading to modest concerns about financial stability because of slowing asset growth, declining profitability, and capital requirements.
  • Local governments have increased their collection of nontax revenue and cut spending on government services. However, these actions have not been enough to close the debt gap.
  • Recent debt-resolution measures, including debt swaps and special refinancing bonds, reduce near-term financing pressure and lower interest costs but do not resolve the underlying mismatch between local governments’ spending responsibilities and their revenues.
  • For China, implications of the debt problem include continued pressure for export-led growth and ongoing technology competition, but little prospect of a major slowdown in China’s military buildup.

Recommendations

  • The United States should continue to focus on technology competition. It will need to maintain—if not increase—counter-espionage efforts and reduce dependence on Chinese inputs that are part of U.S. technology supply chains, such as legacy semiconductors and rare earths. This also suggests that the United States should maintain or improve its own innovation potential.
  • China’s export drive could create opportunities to build international partnerships to constrain China. The United States should lead a coordinated effort among long-standing U.S. partners and other countries that are seeing their industries challenged; this could provide the basis for reforming the world trading system and even creating incentives for China to reform its own economy.
  • If incentives for out-migration from China rise, the United States could benefit by absorbing higher-skilled immigrants from China. Despite security challenges, Chinese nationals have benefited U.S. technology advances and, with proper safeguards, can continue to do so.
  • Even with the stresses to local well-being and national growth in China caused by rising levels of local debt, China will remain a formidable military competitor. Accordingly, continuing to invest in defense to deter China’s aggression will remain a priority for the United States.

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Shatz, Howard J., Robin Wang, Linda Zhang, Timothy R. Heath, and Anthony D'Arrigo, China's Local Government Debt: Implications for U.S.-China Competition. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4570-1.html.
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