This report examines inadvertent escalation risks between NATO and Russia, analysing how conventional military operations, specifically using deep precision strike weapons, could unintentionally increase the risks of nuclear escalation. It identifies key pathways – including C4ISR attacks, counterforce strikes and dual-capable system entanglement – informing NATO defence planning and risk mitigation strategies.

Conventional logics, nuclear fears

Inadvertent escalation risks between NATO and Russia

Paul van Hooft, Mattias Eken, Zsofia Wolford, Artur Honich, Thomas Kenchington, Kiran Suman-Chauhan

ResearchPublished Sep 10, 2026

This report examines the risk of inadvertent escalation between NATO and Russia, whereby the use of conventional weapons by one side could be misperceived by the other as an intentional existential threat to its nuclear deterrent, regime or society. Unlike deliberate or accidental escalation, inadvertent escalation can arise from the structural entanglement of conventional and nuclear capabilities, doctrinal ambiguity, and the compressed decision-making timelines characteristic of modern warfare. Drawing on a review of Cold War and contemporary nuclear rivalries – including the US–Soviet, Sino-American, Korean Peninsula and India–Pakistan cases – alongside interviews with NATO defence officials, the report identifies four principal pathways through which conventional operations could inadvertently trigger nuclear escalation:

  1. Attacks on command, control, communications and intelligence systems
  2. Counterforce strikes against dual-capable delivery systems
  3. The interaction of missile defence with damage-limitation strategies
  4. Conventional actions perceived as existential threats to regime or societal survival.

The analysis applies these pathways to three key subregions of NATO–Russia confrontation: the North Atlantic and High North, the Baltics and Kaliningrad, and the Black Sea region, highlighting how geography, technology and doctrine combine to create distinct escalation risks in each.

The report finds that these inadvertent escalation risks are likely to be cumulative and entropic, growing more unpredictable the longer a conventional conflict endures. The report calls for greater sensitivity among planners and policymakers to the potential blind spots inherent in conventional campaigns, especially as European NATO member states invest more in long range or deep precision strike. This first report lays the analytical foundation for a subsequent report, which will use scenario-based wargaming to further explore these dynamics and inform policy recommendations for managing escalation risk.

Key Takeaways

Modern networked warfare amplifies inadvertent escalation risks

Inadvertent escalation risks stem from technological, doctrinal and strategic developments in modern networked warfare emphasising high-speed, first-mover advantages through counter-C4ISR operations and precision strikes. Russia combines conventional and nuclear assets with information operations, complicating NATO's ability to interpret its intentions. Similarly, NATO's Multi-Domain Operations concept – reliant on integrated C4ISR, dual-capable missiles and compressed decision making – makes it harder to distinguish conventional from nuclear intent. These risks are inherent to contemporary military doctrine on both sides.

The proliferation of dual-capable systems creates identification problems

The growing number of dual-capable systems – ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, aircraft, submarines and supporting C4ISR infrastructure – entangles conventional and nuclear capabilities. Conventional attacks on such systems could be misread as targeting nuclear assets, creating use-it-or-lose-it pressures, while the use of dual-capable systems for conventional purposes may itself suggest nuclear intent. Peacetime developments such as integrated air and missile defence and counterforce doctrine heighten this risk of misinterpretation.

Certain locations carry disproportionate risk, but escalation accumulates unpredictably

Kaliningrad and the Kola Peninsula are likely to create specific escalation risks, as both sides would struggle to avoid engaging with the military systems, including nuclear-related infrastructure, located there during a conflict. However, the report cautions against focusing too narrowly on specific flashpoints. Escalation risks are inherently entropic, compounding as damage to C4ISR and dual-use assets accumulates over time. The risks present in the opening hours of a confrontation differ markedly from those after days or weeks of sustained fighting, with uncertainty growing throughout.

Recommendations

Integrate escalation-sensitivity into planning

  • Military planners should embed escalation-sensitivity analysis into campaign design, command exercises and force posture planning, ensuring awareness of how operational choices, such as strikes on C2 nodes, may inadvertently signal existential threats to Russia.

Maintain communication and risk-reduction channels

  • Military-to-military communication channels, crisis hotlines and confidence-building mechanisms should be preserved even during political confrontation, supported by diplomatic efforts to reaffirm mutual understanding of thresholds and red lines.

Continuously monitor evolving risks

  • Given escalation risk is dynamic, NATO must continuously monitor and reassess how force modernisation, emerging technologies and AI-enabled systems reshape decision-making timelines and miscalculation potential.

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van Hooft, Paul, Mattias Eken, Zsofia Wolford, Artur Honich, Thomas Kenchington, and Kiran Suman-Chauhan, Conventional logics, nuclear fears: Inadvertent escalation risks between NATO and Russia. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2026. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4739-1.html.
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