Download
Full Document
Full Document
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 0.8 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Summary Only
| Format | File Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| PDF file | 0.1 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Purchase
Purchase Print Copy
| Format | List Price | Price | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add to Cart | Paperback68 pages | $20.00 | $16.00 20% Web Discount |
The authors examine the prevalence and consequences of irregularities by military recruiters. Recruiter irregularities are uncommon — using the services' data for tracking allegations between 2007–2009, the authors document about 1 allegation per 1,000 applicants. Between 1 to 3 percent of the recruiter workforce is involved in substantiated allegations in a given year, with concealment or falsification representing the most common form of irregularity. Exploring Army contract data, the authors compare the characteristics of those signing contracts at the end of the recruiting month — when recruiters are under the greatest pressure to meet their monthly recruiting quotas — with those signed earlier in the month. Recruiters appear less likely to carefully screen recruits and more likely to sign marginal applicants at the end of the contract month, leading to some negative outcomes among these enlistees. While undesirable behavior on the part of applicants and/or recruiters appears more prevalent at the end of the recruiting month, patterns in contracts across the course of the recruiting month also suggest the incidence of unreported irregularities is likely to be low.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Background on Recruit Processing and Recruiter Management
Chapter Three
Data
Chapter Four
Results on Allegations
Chapter Five
Analyses of Contract Data
Chapter Six
Conclusions
Appendix A
Overview of Recruiting Policies and Procedures Regarding Improprieties
Appendix B
Derivations
Research conducted by
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Technical report series. RAND technical reports may include research findings on a specific topic that is limited in scope or intended for a narrow audience; present discussions of the methodology employed in research; provide literature reviews, survey instruments, modeling exercises, guidelines for practitioners and research professionals, and supporting documentation; or deliver preliminary findings. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure that they meet high standards for research quality and objectivity.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.