Report
Root Cause Analyses of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches, Volume 1
Nov 7, 2011
The authors investigate whether the tenure of program managers contributes to Nunn-McCurdy breaches. They also examine the existing decentralized systems used to track cost growth to determine whether additional guidance and control are needed to make acquisition category II programs' performance more transparent. Finally, they investigate whether key assumptions, so-called framing assumptions, could be useful risk management tools.
Program Manager Tenure, Oversight of Acquisition Category II Programs, and Framing Assumptions
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Concern with cost overruns in major defense acquisition programs led Congress to direct investigation of the root causes of overruns in programs that have breached Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. The authors calculate program manager tenure to determine whether tenures have lengthened since policy guidance was issued in 2005 and 2007. They also address the question of whether existing decentralized systems used to track the cost growth and performance of acquisition category II programs are sufficient or whether additional centralized guidance and control from the Office of the Secretary of Defense are warranted. A third question deals with the management of cost and schedule risk and whether the identification of key assumptions, which the authors call framing assumptions, could be a useful risk management tool.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Program Manager Tenure
Chapter Three
Oversight of ACAT II Programs
Chapter Four
Framing Assumptions
Chapter Five
Conclusions
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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