Report
Root Cause Analyses of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches, Volume 1
Nov 7, 2011
The authors explore defense contractor motivations and identify mechanisms that might more closely align those incentives with Department of Defense goals. They also analyze major defense acquisition programs to determine if it is possible to identify programs that might incur a future Nunn-McCurdy breach by reviewing a number of acquisition programs that have incurred breaches and analyzing them for common characteristics.
Contractor Motivations and Anticipating Breaches
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With an eye to making defense acquisition more effective and efficient, the authors explore defense contractor motivations in pursuing defense contracts and identify mechanisms that might more closely align those incentives with Department of Defense goals. They enumerate several motivations that drive contractors, most of which center on the financial aspects of running an enterprise. Then, they turn to the other side of the negotiating table and identify areas of influence or levers that the government can use to align the contracting process more closely with contractor motivations. They also analyze major defense acquisition programs to determine if it is possible to identify programs that might incur a future Nunn-McCurdy breach by reviewing a number of acquisition programs that have incurred breaches in the past and analyzing them for common characteristics. Their analytic framework enables oversight officials to identify programs with a greater risk of incurring a critical cost breach, which enables officials to focus more intently on a smaller set of programs and which provides hypotheses about what to look for in these programs.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Contractor Incentives
Chapter Three
A Methodology for Anticipating Nunn-McCurdy Breaches
Chapter Four
Concluding Observations
Appendix A
Membership of the COG
Appendix B
Truth-Revealing Incentive Mechanisms Manages Asymmetric Information Example
Appendix C
Executive Compensation
Appendix D
Exploration of Multiyear Use
Appendix E
Evolution of Nunn-McCurdy Legislation
This research was sponsored by OSD PARCA (Office of the Secretary of Defense office of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analysis) and conducted within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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