Acquisition and Competition Strategy Options for the DD(X)
The U.S. Navy’s 21st Century Destroyer
Download
Download eBook for Free
Full Document
Format | File Size | Notes |
---|---|---|
PDF file | 0.5 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Summary Only
Format | File Size | Notes |
---|---|---|
PDF file | 0.2 MB | Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience. |
Purchase
Purchase Print Copy
Format | List Price | Price | |
---|---|---|---|
Add to Cart | Paperback162 pages | $22.50 | $18.00 20% Web Discount |
As the Navy’s program to build a new family of surface ships enters Phase IV, RAND was assigned to evaluate different acquisition and contracting strategies to achieve the objectives of making the best use of competition, maintaining a strong industrial base, and achieving program cost, schedule, and performance objectives. The authors employed a variety of techniques drawing on the substantial history of competition in various acquisition programs to examine options for the DD(X) program as it existed in 2003. They concluded that competition among prime contractors during detail design and initial production of the system would not be practical, that the 2003 plans for distributing the work should sustain the existing industrial base, and that a mixed strategy employing different contract forms for detail design and serial production would be most appropriate. It should be noted that the program underwent significant changes in 2005, which were not considered in RAND’s study and which might call for different conclusions.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Applications of Competition in Phase IV
Chapter Three
Effects of the DD(X) Production Program on the Shipbuilding Industry
Chapter Four
DD(X) Phase IV Contracting Issues and Options
Chapter Five
Conclusions
Chapter Six
Epilogue: July 2005
Appendix A
DDG 51-Class Case Study
Appendix B
Competition Effects in Recent Shipbuilding Programs
Appendix C
Questionnaire for Shipbuilders
Research conducted by
The research described in this report was prepared for the U.S. Navy. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.