Download

Download eBook for Free

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.6 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Summary Only

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.2 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback162 pages $22.50 $18.00 20% Web Discount

As the Navy’s program to build a new family of surface ships enters Phase IV, RAND was assigned to evaluate different acquisition and contracting strategies to achieve the objectives of making the best use of competition, maintaining a strong industrial base, and achieving program cost, schedule, and performance objectives. The authors employed a variety of techniques drawing on the substantial history of competition in various acquisition programs to examine options for the DD(X) program as it existed in 2003. They concluded that competition among prime contractors during detail design and initial production of the system would not be practical, that the 2003 plans for distributing the work should sustain the existing industrial base, and that a mixed strategy employing different contract forms for detail design and serial production would be most appropriate. It should be noted that the program underwent significant changes in 2005, which were not considered in RAND’s study and which might call for different conclusions.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction

  • Chapter Two

    Applications of Competition in Phase IV

  • Chapter Three

    Effects of the DD(X) Production Program on the Shipbuilding Industry

  • Chapter Four

    DD(X) Phase IV Contracting Issues and Options

  • Chapter Five

    Conclusions

  • Chapter Six

    Epilogue: July 2005

  • Appendix A

    DDG 51-Class Case Study

  • Appendix B

    Competition Effects in Recent Shipbuilding Programs

  • Appendix C

    Questionnaire for Shipbuilders

The research described in this report was prepared for the U.S. Navy. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.