Framing a Strategic Approach for Reserve Component Joint Officer Management
ResearchPublished Oct 27, 2006
This research frames a strategic approach to reserve joint officer management that addresses the requirements for, and the supply of, joint officers in the reserve component, and also accounts for the unique constraints and challenges involved in joint officer management for reserve active-status list officers. Because the work required of many reservists is becoming increasingly joint, the need for a systematic examination of how reserve active-status list officers are trained and developed in joint matters is becoming more and more urgent — especially given the dramatic increase in the use of the reserve forces. A strategic approach to joint officer management for reserve active-status list officers must assess the need for officers with prior joint knowledge, experience, and acculturation in certain positions as well as their availability. The authors estimate the supply of joint reserve officers and make several recommendations to help implement a strategic approach to reserve component joint officer management.
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- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web Only
- Year: 2006
- Pages: 146
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/pubs
- Document Number: MG-517-OSD
Citation
RAND Style Manual
Thie, Harry J., Margaret C. Harrell, Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Al Crego, Roland J. Yardley, and Sonia Nagda, Framing a Strategic Approach for Reserve Component Joint Officer Management, RAND Corporation, MG-517-OSD, 2006. As of July 13, 2026: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG517.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Thie, Harry J., Margaret C. Harrell, Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Al Crego, Roland J. Yardley, and Sonia Nagda, Framing a Strategic Approach for Reserve Component Joint Officer Management. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG517.html.
Research conducted by
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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