The Aftermath of a Great Power War
Research SummaryPublished May 9, 2023
Research SummaryPublished May 9, 2023
Photo by Everett Collection/Alamy Stock Photo
Wars between states are rare, and great power wars — conflicts that involve two or more of the most powerful states in the international system — are even less common. Still, such wars have historically been among the most consequential international events, as they lead to massive casualties and destruction and have the capacity to reshape societies and the international system.
A review of historical great power wars shows that prewar predictions about who would fight, how long the war would last, and how the world would look afterward were often wrong. This history underlines the need for defense planners to carefully examine their assumptions and to seriously consider both intended and unintended outcomes of great power conflicts.
As the Department of Defense increasingly focuses on competition with Russia and China, RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) examined four scenarios illustrating how hypothetical wars with these countries could produce unwanted consequences for the United States — even if the United States is victorious. This report was finalized in January 2021, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has not been subsequently updated.
The history of great power conflict is littered with mistaken predictions. An examination of ten great power wars since 1815 found that, in all cases, politicians and military planners held poor assumptions and made inaccurate predictions about critical aspects of the war that would follow (Table 1). Some of those mistakes are described below.
Incorrect predictions about the parties to a conflict and adversaries' will to fight a long war: Great powers have frequently misunderstood other states' interests and therefore failed to predict the likelihood of third-party interventions in a conflict. Noteworthy examples include Adolf Hitler's underestimation of French and British commitments to Poland in 1939 and Kim Il Sung and Joseph Stalin's assumptions that the United States would not fight to defend South Korea in 1950. In other instances, great powers recognized that their actions might provoke another state to get involved but underestimated that state's willingness to sustain a protracted and costly war.
Misunderstanding the effects of new technology: Strategists often overlooked or discounted evidence that a new technology had altered the conduct of war or the distribution of power. Before World War I, for example, European planners misinterpreted or overlooked ample evidence that changes in technology, organization, and the conduct of war (e.g., trench warfare and chemical weapons) would make battles longer, costlier, and less decisive.
Incorrect predictions about the length, intensity, or cost of conflict: Great powers have frequently underestimated the conflict's duration and the scale of military losses. Perhaps the most infamous example is World War I and the European powers' prediction in July 1914 that the conflict would be over by Christmas.
Misunderstandings about the consequences of conflict: States have struggled to foresee the strategic consequences of a conflict, including the durability of wartime gains, the ease of restoring stability, the risk of a conflict recurring, and the long-term implications for the balance of power. Concentration on the task of defeating a rival or securing territorial and political concessions has often led states to overestimate their ability to hold onto wartime gains, as Japan discovered after its wars with China in 1894 and Russia in 1905. Similarly, states have overestimated how decisive a war's outcome would be, or they have underestimated the risk of postwar instability. Territorial compromises and new governing arrangements can produce or inflame new flash points for later crises. For example, having allied to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark in 1864, Austria and Prussia went to war a mere two years later, partly over control of the same territory. A war's potential effect on the regional or international balance of power can be difficult to predict. For example, neither U.S. nor European strategists anticipated the scale of U.S. military, industrial, economic, and political domination that followed World War II.
Why did politicians and military planners get it so wrong? In some cases, there were obvious shortcomings in analysis or decisionmaking. In other cases, states that historically had been dominant overlooked new evidence, such as the consequences of changing military technology, that the distribution of power had shifted. Even states that avoided known decisionmaking pitfalls faced uncertainty because of a lack of information and the difficulty of predicting the complex interactions that might occur during and following a large-scale war. Regardless of the causes of these incorrect predictions, their legacy reinforces for today's planners and decisionmakers the importance of humility in predicting the course of a conflict or the postwar environment. Leaders and planners should question their own assumptions about the nature of the conflict, its outcome in terms of winners and losers, and the geostrategic aftermath. Examining a range of scenarios with different outcomes can help leaders and planners think about the choices they might face if future conflicts and their aftermaths do not turn out as expected.
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Great Power Conflict | Length | Parties to conflict | Effects of new technology | Intensity of fighting and extent of damage | Consequences for regional and global balance of power |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Crimean War | 1853–1856 | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate |
Austro-Prussian War | 1866 | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Accurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate |
Franco-Prussian War | 1870–1871 | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate |
Russo-Turkish War | 1877–1878 | Inaccurate | Accurate | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Accurate |
Sino-Japanese War | 1894 | Accurate | Accurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate |
Russo-Japanese War | 1904–1905 | Accurate | Accurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate |
World War I | 1914–1918 | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Inaccurate |
World War II | Asia | 1931–1945 | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Inaccurate |
World War II | Europe | 1939–1945 | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate | Inaccurate |
Korean War | 1950–1953 | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Inaccurate | Partially accurate, or only some combatants' predictions were accurate |
How can today's decisionmakers and military planners avoid the mistakes of earlier generations? Strategy and war planning involve great uncertainty, and there is no foolproof way to predict how conflicts will arise, the course they will take, who will win, and what the world will look like afterward. But planners can manage uncertainty by examining a broad range of plausible scenarios and outcomes, especially those that challenge their assumptions and expectations.
In 2020, the authors examined four unlikely but plausible scenarios that illustrate a range of outcomes resulting from hypothetical great power conflicts with China and/or Russia taking place within the next five years. For each, the authors analyzed how decisions made during those conflicts would affect the postwar strategic setting. The purpose is to challenge planners to think critically about their assumptions and to consider potential unintended outcomes.
The authors intentionally developed scenarios that would lead to different outcomes, including a decisive U.S. win, a decisive adversary win, and an indecisive result. In each case, the authors worked backward to envision a prewar context and set of stakes that could reasonably end in that outcome; further, they structured the scenarios to include a range of nuclear dynamics (i.e., threatened, inadvertent, and deliberate use of nuclear weapons). Having determined these factors, the authors then systematically assessed how individual states would likely behave and how their choices would interact both over the course of the war and, crucially, in its aftermath. Certain aspects of the war scenarios were set as fixed, but the postwar behavior of states was based entirely on assessments of how states would be most likely to respond to the circumstances at the end of each war. To make these assessments, the authors drew on research of contemporary decisionmaking in each state: international relations literature on decisionmaking, interstate war, and alliances; and analogies from the conduct and aftermath of historical great power wars.
Table 2 lists the scenarios that were developed and analyzed. The scenarios are not meant to be exhaustive, and a different set of scenarios could emphasize different issues for decisionmakers.
Scenario | Key Parties to the Conflict | Role of Nuclear Weapons | Length of Conflict | Victor | Strategic Outcomes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
China annexes Taiwan |
|
Conflict ends with China's demonstration of an NSNW | 8 months | China |
|
United States degrades China's military power in escalating East China Sea conflict |
|
Possibility of nuclear escalation affects combatants' decisions | 6 months | United States and Japan |
|
Unexpected war over Taiwan ends in a frozen conflict |
|
Possibility of nuclear escalation affects combatants' decisions | 4 months | Indecisive |
|
War caused by Russian misperception ends in restrictions on military forces in Northeastern Europe |
|
Russian losses lead to use of NSNWs and to U.S. use of NSNWs in response | 3 months | Indecisive |
|
NOTE: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; NSNW = nonstrategic nuclear weapon; PRC = People's Republic of China.
The United States refocuses its military around the challenge of defending PATO and preventing China from using coercion to force other states into Beijing's orbit. This means
During the "frozen war" period, the joint force remains active and alert to the likelihood of a return to conflict. This means
Although the hypothetical scenarios do not consider the full range of conflicts that the United States could face, they highlight plausible consequences that U.S. decisionmakers and planners should consider.
Strategy and war planning involve great uncertainty. There is no foolproof way to predict how conflicts will arise, the course they will take, who will win, and what the world will look like afterwards. But planners can manage uncertainty by examining a broad range of plausible scenarios and outcomes, especially those that challenge their assumptions and expectations.
Wartime victory may not produce a favorable postwar setting. For example, a difficult and costly conflict can weaken the victor, providing advantages to other states that were not parties to the conflict. A victor also might face stronger balancing coalitions as other states become more concerned about the victor's enhanced capabilities or intentions. Victors also could have to contend with domestic crises as civilian populations grapple with the high costs of the war. Finally, the terms of the peace settlement or the failure to address enduring issues can increase the risk of renewed conflict.
A U.S. victory could drive China and Russia closer together. Mutual mistrust and disputes have prevented China and Russia from forging deeper military ties, but the countries could overcome these differences and fight together to prevent the United States from achieving a massive victory over either. Even if they do not fight together, they may see a partnership as the best way to deter U.S. opportunism in a postwar phase.
The Indo-Pacific is likely to be a postwar priority for the United States. China would benefit from a European war that weakens the United States and Russia, heightening postwar U.S. security concerns in Asia. Should a direct conflict between China and the United States occur instead, China would likely remain an important international actor and strategic competitor with the United States, even in defeat. By contrast, a defeated Russia would likely struggle to rebuild and would pose a lesser threat to the United States than would a defeated China. Thus, in each of the great power conflict scenarios assessed, the United States was likely to sharpen its postwar focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Although wars can strengthen bonds between allies, postwar alliance cohesion could suffer. Disagreements about war aims or willingness to risk escalation could cause allies to rethink their commitments even after the war is won. Moreover, U.S. allies and partners might face new incentives to develop nuclear weapons if they feel the United States can no longer guarantee their security.
Allied contributions to a U.S.-led war with Russia or China might vary. Each country would need to grapple with competing considerations, such as the desires to sustain a relationship with the United States, to balance against aggression, and to avoid economic or military retaliation by Russia or China. The United States should develop multiple basing options for key contingencies, in case allies choose not to grant access.
Photo by the U.S. Army
Military planners should evaluate whether existing war plans support long-term U.S. interests. This means assessing the postwar consequences of conflicts that go according to assumptions as well as those that do not. This type of analysis would help reveal possible tensions between short- and long-term postwar goals.
The services and the joint force should consider setting a "futures game" in a period following a great power war. Futures games allow planners to consider how new concepts and systems would fare in a hypothetical conflict. Setting a futures game after a great power war would allow the services to evaluate whether programs are robust in postwar strategic environments that might be very different from what the United States faces today.
U.S. and allied decisionmakers should be fully briefed and educated about the potential operational and strategic consequences of nuclear weapons use. These topics have not been emphasized since the end of the Cold War, and relatively few wargames involve the use of nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool. U.S. and allied decisionmakers should also consider potential responses to reduce the risk of surprise or hasty reactions in the (hopefully unlikely) event that nuclear weapons are threatened or used in a conflict.
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