Are Current Military Education Benefits Efficient and Effective for the Services?
ResearchPublished Jun 19, 2017
A primary purpose of military education benefits is to assist service members' transitions back to civilian life, but the benefits likely have implications for recruiting and retention as well. This research takes a mixed-methods approach to examine the effects of education benefit programs on recruiting and retention–related outcomes, and to assess how the two largest education benefits may work together.
ResearchPublished Jun 19, 2017
Service members have access to a variety of education benefits. A primary purpose of these benefits is to assist service members' transitions back to civilian life, but the benefits likely have implications for recruiting and retention as well. This research for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness takes a mixed-methods approach to examine the effects of education benefit programs on recruiting and retention–related outcomes, and to assess how the two largest education benefits may work together. As part of the study, RAND researchers examine Internet search data, qualitative data from focus groups with new service members and interviews with college counselors, survey data in which service members report their plans to use education benefits, and quantitative data on the Post-9/11 GI Bill and Tuition Assistance, as well as information from service members' administrative records. One main finding is that the passage of the Post-9/11 GI Bill appears to have had relatively small effects on recruiting and retention. A likely reason for this is that service members appear to lack a detailed understanding of this benefit, especially in their early careers. Another main finding is that service members appear to use both the Tuition Assistance and Post-9/11 GI Bill programs together to further their education.
This research was sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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