Review of Army Total Force Policy Implementation
ResearchPublished Oct 24, 2017
This report reviews the extent to which the Army has implemented the actions directed by the Army Total Force Policy, issued in 2012. In general, the Army has made progress in integrating the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve, but budget constraints have limited implementation of some objectives. We recommend that the Army continue to develop innovative solutions and set goals and metrics to monitor progress.
ResearchPublished Oct 24, 2017
This report reviews the implementation of the Army's Total Force Policy (ATFP). It presents an analysis of the extent to which the Army has implemented the actions directed by the ATFP, how these efforts benefitted the different components and enhanced the total force, whether implementation actions to date caused negative unintended consequences, and how the Army might improve the ATFP to achieve a more cost effective, integrated and capable total force. We find that, in general, the Army has made progress in implementing the policy and improving the integration of the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. However, budget constraints have limited implementation of some objectives, such as multicomponent training, reserve component equipment modernization, and use of 12304b mobilization authority. Since the Army's budget is likely to remain constrained in the future, we recommend that it continue to pursue and develop innovative solutions, such as multicomponent vehicle loans, positioning modernized equipment at regional training and mobilization sites, and integrating individual training and professional military education under the One Army School System. We also recommend that the Army set measurable goals for total force integration and establish metrics to monitor progress, and evaluate pilot programs such as associated units and combining recruiting and marketing functions to determine whether they are meeting their intent.
This research was sponsored by the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, and conducted by the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program within the RAND Arroyo Center.
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