Countering Threats to Correctional Institution Security

Identifying Innovation Needs to Address Current and Emerging Concerns

by Joe Russo, Dulani Woods, John S. Shaffer, Brian A. Jackson

Download eBook for Free

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.6 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Research Questions

  1. What challenges do correctional facilities and agencies face in terms of correctional institutional security, and how can these challenges be addressed?
  2. What are the high-priority needs associated with institutional security?

Some threats to correctional institutional security — e.g., violence, escape attempts, contraband — are as old as the institutions themselves, while other threats — e.g., computer hacking, synthetic drugs, cell phones, drones — have evolved with societal and technological changes. Many of these threats present risks to public safety as a whole. In light of the ongoing challenges the corrections sector faces in countering these threats, RAND researchers convened an expert workshop to better understand the challenges and identify the high-priority needs associated with threats to institutional security.

Unfortunately, resource and staffing challenges limit the ability of correctional institutions to adapt to shifts in threats and to adjust security and staffing strategies over time. Furthermore, a perpetual lack of empirical data hampers efforts to effectively develop interventions to address threats. Addressing the research needs and developing the tools and resources — as prioritized by the workshop participants — is one route to providing correctional institutions the support needed to confront security threats going forward.

Key Findings

Expert workshop participants identified 11 high-priority needs for preventing threats to institutional security

  • Understaffing is a major threat; staffing ratio standards are needed, as are recruitment and retention strategies to meet these standards.
  • Supervisors need better training and a manageable span of control in order to properly develop staff.
  • Tools are needed to identify staff prone to compromise.
  • Better technology and best practices are needed to detect drugs, cell phones, and weapons.
  • Fully electronic mail systems should be explored to reduce the influx of drugs and protect staff and inmates from harm.
  • Research and testing centers are needed to evaluate emerging technology solutions to threats (e.g., cell phones, drones).
  • Administrators need greater awareness of cyber threats and information technology–related risks and need increased capacity to address these risks.
  • Best practices are needed to balance inmate access to technology for reentry purposes with security concerns.
  • Best practices are needed for security threat group management.
  • Technology is needed to automate analysis of inmate communications.
  • Best practices are needed for the development of continuity of operations plans.

Recommendations

  • Inadequate staffing in terms of numbers and/or quality is a direct threat to institutional security. Innovative strategies are needed to attract recruits, and processes are required to screen out individuals who may be prone to misconduct or compromise. Supervisors are key to improving officer engagement and job satisfaction, which can support retention efforts.
  • Drugs, cell phones, and non-metallic weapons were identified as the types of contraband that pose the greatest threats to institutional security. The group argued for better technology options for detection and the exploration of best practices to search staff and visitors. The viability of purely electronic mail systems should be explored to reduce the influx of drugs entering institutions through physical mail. Finally, national data are needed on the extent of the problem in correctional facilities.
  • Security threat groups (STGs), or gangs, continue to plague correctional institutions. Research is needed to identify best practices to manage this difficult population. Technologies to efficiently analyze inmate communications and identify associations based on inmate movement patterns would help control criminal activity. Furthermore, institutions need to do a better job of sharing information on STGs with counterparts across the country, as well as with law enforcement agencies.
  • The correctional institution of today faces threats that were likely not anticipated a few decades ago. Many institutions have incorporated information technology to support operations, but few have the resources or foresight to anticipate and fully address the associated cyber threats. Institutions need greater awareness of these threats and greater information security specialist capacity. Furthermore, because it is becoming more important to allow inmates access to technology to prepare them for reentry, it is critical that institutions understand best practices for managing cyber risks.

Research conducted by

The research described in this report was prepared for the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and conducted by the Justice Policy Program within RAND Social and Economic Well-Being.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.