Toward Meaningful Military Compensation Reform
Research in Support of DoD's Review
ResearchPublished Nov 12, 2014
Analyzes many alternatives for reforming the military compensation system, focusing on retirement compensation, and reaches two concepts for reform. Both concepts retain positive aspects of the current system while also providing cost savings, improving equity, potentially adding force management flexibility, and simplifying the Department of Defense disability compensation system.
Research in Support of DoD's Review
ResearchPublished Nov 12, 2014
Pressure to reduce the federal deficit, planned reductions in strength, concerns about cost, and perceptions expressed by military leaders, past commissions, and studies about the lack of fairness of the military compensation system have placed increased attention on military compensation as an area for reform. In September 2011, the Office of the Secretary of Defense convened a working group of senior representatives throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) to conduct a comprehensive review of military compensation, focusing on retirement compensation.
The group's deliberations built on the findings of past reviews and were informed by RAND's analysis over the 18 months that the group met. We used and extended RAND's dynamic retention model to assess many proposals for their effects on active and reserve retention and cost — that culminated in assisting the group to identify two broad design concepts. We also evaluated options for implementing reforms in the transition to the steady state (i.e., when all service members are receiving retirement benefits under the new retirement system), and we evaluated proposals for disability compensation reform.
The two design concepts retain positive aspects of the current system while addressing criticisms of the system related to the fairness and fiscal sustainability. Our analysis shows that both concepts are feasible, provide cost savings, improve equity, potentially add force management flexibility, and simplify the DoD disability compensation system. We find that DoD cost savings begin at once, while Treasury outlays initially increase and later decrease below baseline outlays. Allowing members grandfathered under the old system to participate in the new system hastens both effects. Both concepts give rise to the same willingness to stay in service, and so sustain readiness by maintaining force size and experience.
This research was conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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