How the United States Retrenches Matters
Key NATO Allies’ Likely Responses to Alternative U.S. Approaches
Research SummaryPublished Oct 28, 2026
This research was made possible by the Stand Together Trust and Peter Richards.
Key NATO Allies’ Likely Responses to Alternative U.S. Approaches
Research SummaryPublished Oct 28, 2026
This research was made possible by the Stand Together Trust and Peter Richards.
Since coming into office, the second Trump administration has been reshaping U.S. policy toward Europe. In addition to imposing tariffs, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to NATO, seeking control of Greenland, and reducing support for Ukraine, the administration has called for a reduced U.S. security role in Europe. The administration's concept for Europe—NATO 3.0—envisions allies taking primary responsibility for their own conventional defense. In line with this vision, the administration has reduced planned contributions to NATO crisis operations, announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops stationed in Germany, and launched a review to inform further force reductions.
A RAND study provides insights into how four of the most influential and militarily capable NATO allies (France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom) would likely respond to further U.S. retrenchment and identifies steps the United States can take to realize its strategic goals and mitigate risks of unintended reactions. These four allies are key, given that France and the UK are Europe's only nuclear powers, Germany is its largest economy, and Poland is an increasingly capable ally that now has the third-largest active-duty force in NATO.
Working from the assumption that the United States maintains its formal commitments to allies through the North Atlantic Treaty, the research team examined how the four allies would likely react to different U.S. approaches to retrenchment, focusing on changes to commitments and posture, as well as two other important policy areas: tariffs and policy toward Russia. The analysis considered how U.S. policy alternatives would affect the four allies' perceptions, actions, and cooperation with each other (see sidebar).
The researchers approached each ally individually and in the context of its unique circumstances. The research team found that the four countries will likely respond to U.S. retrenchment in similar ways—driven in part by a shared, high threat perception of Russia—but there are some ways that the countries may diverge in their responses, highlighted below.
Allies will likely seek to sustain remaining security and economic ties with the United States in the face of coordinated, gradual U.S. retrenchment. Allies see the United States as an irreplaceable partner and would likely try to preserve remaining ties in the face of what allies would see as an undesirable, but relatively responsible, U.S. approach to retrenchment.
But allies might see the United States as a less reliable arms supplier in the face of a large-scale, uncoordinated, rapid withdrawal. Allies believe that such a U.S. move would create capability gaps that would leave them vulnerable to a Russian attack. In turn, allies might see the United States as indifferent to their security and therefore an unreliable source for arms. Loss of trust in the United States as a reliable ally and arms supplier could cause allies to take more-aggressive steps to reduce reliance on the U.S. industrial base, likely accelerating UK, German, and Polish shifts away from U.S. defense systems and toward European or sovereign alternatives.
Other U.S. actions and statements that coincide with retrenchment and suggest fundamentally diverging U.S.-European interests could lead allies to reduce economic and technological dependence on and intelligence-sharing with the United States. For example, U.S. pursuit of rapprochement with Moscow while Russia's war in Ukraine continues could lead allies to fear that Washington has fundamentally different interests—a concern that would likely be felt most acutely in Poland, a frontline state with historically high threat perceptions of Moscow. Such a policy, in turn, could lead allies to reduce intelligence-sharing out of fear that the United States might share sensitive information with Moscow. Further U.S. tariffs or export controls might accelerate allies' efforts to reduce economic and technological dependence on the United States, with Poland likely to expand economic cooperation with European and non-European partners and the UK likely to deepen economic ties with the European Union, potentially accelerating UK purchases of European arms.
None of the four allies will pursue security alignment with Russia or China, regardless of the U.S. approach to retrenchment. Allies see Russia as a threat and China's interests as misaligned with theirs. The four allies do not have risk factors for aligning, or bandwagoning, with a rival. Even so, worries about a NATO-Russia conflict could lead some allies—especially Poland—to harden their policies toward Moscow, taking more-assertive steps (e.g., in response to Russian airspace violations) to signal resolve despite weaker U.S. commitments, while others might moderate their approach, such as by reducing military support to Ukraine. On China, the UK and Poland would likely take a harder line if they believed that doing so might favorably affect U.S. presence or commitments.
Electoral gains by the far right or far left could make France or Germany more likely to adopt a less hardline approach to Russia, regardless of U.S. policy. Both countries have histories of outreach to Moscow, and such parties gaining power could prompt renewed engagement with Russia, particularly if the United States abandons its effort to broker ceasefire talks between Russia and Ukraine. Poland, by contrast, would likely wait the longest to soften its stance toward Russia even if the United States brokers a durable ceasefire, given Warsaw's conviction that any sign of Western softness emboldens Moscow.
Perceived U.S. disinterest in European stability would likely push all four allies to prioritize ties with European partners over ties with the United States.
Initiating plans for large-scale force withdrawals and further reductions in crisis contributions would likely spur allies to cooperate more deeply with each other and, in some cases, increase defense spending further. Allies have already initiated such changes because of the threat from Russia, especially after 2022, and the growing prospect of U.S. retrenchment in 2025. The United States taking more-tangible steps to retrench would likely reinforce this trend. Poland is most likely to increase defense spending further in response, given its higher threat perceptions and growing economy, including possible consideration of independent nuclear capabilities as feelings of acute vulnerability grow. Germany is somewhat likely to further increase spending, especially if increases can be tied to investments that promote domestic economic growth.
France and the UK will struggle to meet defense spending targets, especially if U.S. policies add more economic headwinds. Both countries are already struggling to meet NATO spending targets given fiscal constraints; additional tariffs could modestly reduce the countries' fiscal capacity and erode public support for defense spending.
Therefore, France and the UK may scale back—though not eliminate—spending for missions outside Europe in response to large-scale U.S. retrenchment or a U.S. détente with Russia that does not prioritize European security.
U.S. pursuit of a détente with Russia that does not prioritize European security could also stimulate European cooperation but would also likely lead allies to reduce cooperation with the United States. Perceived U.S. disinterest in European stability would likely push all four allies to prioritize ties with European partners over ties with the United States, to the extent the two come into conflict. As with other actions that suggest diverging interests, such a détente could also lead allies to reduce their reliance on U.S. arms over time and prompt reduced intelligence-sharing and defense coordination.
The costs and trade-offs associated with higher defense spending and regional cooperation could increase political resistance and contribute to social unrest. Future electoral gains by far-right and far-left parties would likely increase political pressure to reduce defense spending, particularly in Germany and to a lesser extent in France and the UK. Such electoral shifts would also likely increase resistance to regional cooperation.
Allies would likely have diverse responses to greater U.S. use of presence and commitments to reward and punish individual states, which could create fissures that undermine regional cooperation. Poland, the UK, and—to a lesser extent—Germany might be willing to make concessions, such as buying U.S. arms, to preserve favored status with Washington, even if doing so comes at the expense of deeper European cooperation. France, by contrast, is less inclined to prioritize bilateral concessions to the United States over its emphasis on European strategic autonomy. Differential treatment therefore risks undercutting regional security cooperation and, in turn, NATO 3.0's goal of increasing European capabilities for collective defense.
Differential treatment of allies risks undercutting regional security cooperation and, in turn, NATO 3.0's goal of increasing European capabilities for collective defense.
The United States should take the following steps to implement NATO 3.0 or other future concepts that aim to maintain a partnership with Europe while increasing burden-sharing and reducing the U.S. military role:
This brief summarizes findings from a study that explored how four influential NATO allies (France, Germany, Poland, and the UK) might react to U.S. retrenchment from Europe, focusing on outcomes with implications for U.S. interests. Researchers used three sources to anticipate allied reactions, each offsetting the limitations of the others: applied lessons from history; public debates taking place in, and official documents from, the four countries in 2025 and 2026; and interviews with policymakers and experts in the four countries in mid-2025. The analysis aimed to isolate the effects of U.S. policies, even though U.S. policies may not be the primary driver of allies' choices. The findings of the analysis apply only to the four allies and not necessarily all other NATO members.
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