Report
Assessing Retention and Special and Incentive Pays for Army and Navy Commissioned Officers in the Special Operations Forces
Feb 18, 2019
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After more than a decade of war, the military services have many returning personnel with mental health needs, and thus the United States needs to ensure that it has the capacity to address their needs. Officer special and incentive (S&I) pays are used to create incentives for officer retention to meet manning requirements. However, no capability exists to assess how alternative S&I pay adjustments affect the retention of mental health care officers, and, as a result, policymakers lack an analytical and empirical basis for determining the effect of such adjustments on retention.
The authors of this report adapt RAND's dynamic retention model (DRM) to handle multiyear special pay and develop estimates of expected military and civilian pay over a career, which are needed inputs to the model. Using longitudinal data on officer retention for entry cohorts from 1990 to 2000 followed to 2010, the authors obtain DRM parameter estimates for psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, occupational therapists, physician assistants, and social workers. Nearly all estimates are statistically significant, and the estimated models fit the data well. To demonstrate the needed capability, the authors use the estimated models to simulate the retention effects of alternative S&I pays.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Military Financial Aid Programs for Physicians
Chapter Three
Conceptualizing and Modeling the Military Financial Aid Choice and Retention Decision
Chapter Four
Active Component Earnings of Mental Health Professionals
Chapter Five
Civilian Earnings of Mental Health Professionals
Chapter Six
Dynamic Retention Model Parameter Estimation
Chapter Seven
Policy Simulations and Analyses
Chapter Eight
Conclusion
Appendix A
Cost to the Individual of a Two-Period Commitment
Appendix B
Possible Selectivity by Military Financial Aid Pathway
Appendix C
Reserve Duty Earnings
Appendix D
Comparisons of Military Pay Using the Pay Table Approach Versus Observed Pay from the Pay Files
Appendix E
Civilian Earnings of Mental Health Care Providers
Appendix F
Civilian Earnings of Female Physicians
This research was conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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